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INTRODUCTION

The ascendancy and mysticism of supranational human rights adjudication have exerted a stronghold on human rights lawyers' liberal
cosmopolitanism. This exuberance is reflected today in a wide range of
human rights courts, quasi-judicial tribunals, and treaty bodies within
the United Nations (U.N.) and across regional settings. Most critics
have gauged the concurrent, overlapping jurisdiction and activities of
*
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Zumbansen and the participants in the Graduate Law Students' Association of Osgoode Hall
Law School Conference 2006, Scholars & Advocates: Driving the Changing Face(s) of the
Law, Toronto, Canada (May 5-6, 2006) for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Stephen
Toope supported this project from the beginning and prompted me that critical engagement
with the problematic of identity in the international law/international relations dual agenda in
the field of human rights was worth pursuing. I benefited immensely from conversations with
Obiora Okafor and Craig Scott. Julien Cantegreil sharp-wittingly challenged my sometimes
agnostic readings of Koh.
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human rights treaty bodies and tribunals as signaling imminent crisis,
creating a world-wide sweep of divergent or conflicting interpretations
of parallel treaty texts and threatening, in turn, to create confusion and
undermine the authority of these tribunals and even the jurists who
serve on them.' Those who ultimately find credence in such "integrityanxiety '' 2 fail to engage the contradictions and exclusionary and distributive effects of liberalism's fetishized culture of resistance to the
politics of human rights. At a much deeper level, all of these critiques
make the claim, but fail to articulate and test it, that there exists a single coherent and secularized international human rights regime. The
feared divergence of results is cast as a refutation of that premise necessitating steps to rectify a problem-the enforcement of international
human rights norms domestically-presented as one pertaining to the
internal coherence and progress of the discipline.
Throughout the 1990s, these critiques generated demands for largescale reform of an ailing U.N. human rights monitoring system.
Independent expert Philip Alston produced three reports in 1989, 1993,
and 1997 tabling blueprints for such institutional reform.3 At that time,
the U.N. had, incidentally, firmly cast its stranglehold on the international community by asserting the universality, indivisibility, and
interdependence of human rights. Reference to this "common lan1.
See generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED
NATION S. A CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 229-43 (1986); Thomas Buergenthal,
International and Regional Human Rights Law and Institutions: Some Examples of Their
Interaction, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 321 (1977); Marc-Andrd Eissen, The European Convention on
Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Problems of
Coexistence, 22 BUFF.L. REV. 181 (1972); Theodor Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in
International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754
(1982); A.A. Cangado Trindade, Co-Existence and Co-Ordinationof Mechanisms of Protection of Human Rights, 202 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACAD9MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 13
(1987).
2.
The expression is Frank Michelman's, who uses it in a typically Dworkinian vein to
explain why U.S. judges resist participation in a global judicial conversation through a justificatory politics which cannot be reduced to parochialism, elitism or political partisanship. He
defines integrity-anxiety as "a perceived threat to the integrity ... of the historic discourse of
American constitutional law respecting rights" See Frank Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety?, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 241, 264 (M. Ignatieff ed., 2005). For him,
"[t]o speak of the integrity of this discourse is to speak of its unbroken identity through time
as a distinctly cognizable, self-contained discursive object-a kind of discursive domain unto
itself, visibly separate and freestanding from other normative discourses." Id.
3.
Of particular relevance to the argument developed in this Article is Philip Alston's
1993 (interim) report. See World Conference on Human Rights, Geneva, Switz, Apr. 19-30,
1993, Interim Report of Study on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Rggime, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.l/Rev.1 (Apr. 22,
1993) (preparedby Philip Alston) [hereinafter Alston 1993 Report].
4.
World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declarationand Programmeof Action, pt. 1, 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/24 (Oct. 13, 1993).
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guage of humanity,' 5 alongside the new sexy dressings of mutually reinforcing human rights in relation to development,6 has since become the
buzzword in mainstream rights-discourse.
The need for coherent and consistent jurisprudence to fend off the
"worst-case consequences" of the proliferation of human rights norms
and institutions alluded to by Alston in his successive reports to the General Assembly 7 is rarely read, however, against the backdrop of the post
Cold-War crisis in international human rights in relation to Third World
States. The celebratory mood for policy-based pragmatism and innovation of the 1960s and 1970s, which had given rise to this proliferation,
had flattened by the early 1990s to give way to calls for institutional revamping and a greater focus on "effectiveness," in order to grapple with
the apparent disparity between often-celebrated normative achievements
in this realm and the often-lamented failures to enforce them. With the
concomitant enlargement of the now-defunct U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1990 from forty-four to fifty-three states, Third World
states were seen as having a decisive say over whether a country would
be investigated or not for alleged human rights violations.8 Faced with
the risk of "politicization" of law and a much-romanticized Third World
nationalist solidarity accompanying claims of cultural relativism9 the
fault lines and links between calls for disciplinary renewal, domestic
norm reception, and the extension of the global reach of international
human rights norms and institutions had to be redrawn and reinforced.
Such a reconfiguration operated on two planes. On the institutional
level, while Alston's 1993 interim report underscored that shortcomings
in treaty implementation efforts had to be linked to the complementarity
between universal and regional human rights systems, he was cautious
not to advocate the consolidation of the treaty bodies and regional courts

5.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Human Rights: The Common Language of Humanity, in

UNITED NATIONS, WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS: THE VIENNA DECLARATION AND

PROGRAMME OF ACTION: JUNE

6.

1993, at 8 (1994).

See 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1,

121, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess.,

U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, (Oct. 24, 2005) ("affirm[ing] that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually reinforcing ...").For the special case of
development, see also HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).
7.
Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, I 241, 245, 250-51.
Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 23, 26 (1990) ("The 'politicization' of human
8.
rights, and, in particular, their subordination to ideological conflict and to Third World solidarity, have resulted in more concern with human rights violations in some countries than in
others, and human rights are the text, or the pretext, for attacks on particular states ....Inevitably, politicized scrutiny attenuates the influence of the United Nations and distorts the
human rights movement."); see also id. at 27.
9.
Id. at26.
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into a single entity.'0 The reasons for such recalcitrance were framed as
structural and technical, rather than political. First, specific attributes of
the twin international human rights Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
and issue-specific treaties (racial discrimination, torture, women's rights,
etc.) adopted in the United Nations rendered the treaty bodies more
amenable to consolidation with one another than to consolidation with
their regional counterparts." Second, problems of system overload, scarcity of resources, and burdensome proliferation of state reporting duties
Alston identified in the reports as hampering effectiveness simply did
not arise when probing the treaty bodies' relationship with their regional
brethren.' 2 Nor was there, for similar reasons, any underlying concern for
harnessing an "interactive diversity" of professional expertise and social
praxes, the impetus for both resisting and welcoming the long-term consolidation of the (now) eight sister treaty bodies with core mandates
ranging from children's to migrant workers' rights, gender discrimination to economic, social and cultural, and disability rights.'3 Alston's
proposed changes, rather, consisted of improving coordination among
the treaty bodies' and regional tribunals' jurisprudence by enhancing and
formalizing "effective channels of communication"' 4 among jurists to
promote an exchange of views over shared human rights standards.
While the anti-formalism advocated in these reforms could be read
as a catalyst for studying the procedural means to achieve a preordained
goal, such a view would appear to be seriously misleading. On the substantive level, the U.N. reform agenda of the 1990s was rationalized by
post-Cold War international human rights lawyers as the occasion for the
complete maturation of human rights norms and institutions under the
progressive mantra of "universalism."' 5 This was seen as a means of sal10.
The recent proposal by the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human
Rights for a unified standing treaty body is thus limited to the U.N. monitoring system. See
The Secretariat, Concept Paperon the High Commissioner'sProposalfor a Unified Standing
Treaty Body, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2006/2 (Mar. 22, 2006).
11.
See generally Craig Scott, The Interdependence and Permeability of Human Rights
Norms: Towards a Partial Fusion of the International Covenants on Human Rights, 27 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 769, 772 (1989); Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, 9N 139-63.
12.
See, e.g., Philip Alston, Report on Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International
Instruments on Human Rights, 179, U.N. Doc A/44/668 (Nov. 8, 1989).
13.
The expression "interactive diversity of knowledge" was coined and operationalized
by Craig Scott. See Craig Scott, Bodies of Knowledge: A Diversity Promotion Role for the UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY
MONITORING 403,404-11 (Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000).
14.
See Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, 246.
15.
Thus, using the metaphor of a child maturing through adolescence, Alston describes
elsewhere in his scholarly work the post-Cold War evolution of international human rights law
as "a necessary developmental phase and one which, if successfully negotiated, will facilitate

Winter 2010]

Transjudicialism'sComing of Age

vaging the discipline's self-image following, on the one hand, the disillusionment of Cold-War politics, ascendancy of Third Worldism, and
claims of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction and, on the other,
the rise of "end of history"-type arguments in the immediate post-Cold
War era. At their core, all the proposals tabled by Alston argued in one
form or another that cross-fertilization, if properly enhanced and facilitated, could materially benefit international human rights law. 16 It may
have been expected that these studies would provide references to what
ought to characterize an "effective" human rights legalism as a means of
distancing it from the claimed ineffectual political climate of the time.
But in none of Alston's reports was the key notion of "effectiveness"
defined or discussed beyond a high level of rhetoric.17
By 2003, further work on coordination between the U.N. human
rights treaty regime and regional bodies to achieve effectiveness was
largely abandoned. Instead the focus shifted to reforming the treaty body
system through harmonization and streamlining of reporting procedures
and consolidation for the "effective implementation of human rights instruments" and "effective functioning of the treaty bodies."" The post
Cold-War debate on human rights regime effectiveness did not, thus,
take place merely on an existential level, stripped from lawyers' exegetic
task of defining and shaping positive rules. Yet its real importance was
claimed to lie beyond mere legalistic quibbles, namely in explaining the
technocratic problematic of "compliance" with human rights norms and
decisions.'9 Indeed, many international lawyers still look to enforcement
as the answer to perennial debates on the perceived "ineffectiveness" of
the transition to maturity and a renewed self-confidence" See Philip Alston, Introduction, in
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW,

at xi (Philip Alston ed., 1996).

See Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, 36 for summary conclusions and recom16.
mendations. See also International Law Association (ILA), Berlin Conference 2004,
International Human Rights Law and Practice, Final Report on the Impact of Findings of the
United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Part D, and Conference Resolution No. 4/2004,
pmbl. 6 [hereinafter 2004 LA Berlin Report].
17.
Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, 246. Given that any descriptive or normative
account of effectiveness is a function of the assumptions underlying any particular understanding of that term, it is deliberately not defined in this Article. As a conceptual matter, however,
effectiveness is distinguished from "effective enjoyment" of individual rights and fundamental
freedoms as this doctrinal concept has been expounded upon in U.N. diplomatic practice and
European jurisprudence. Id. According to the doctrine of "effectiveness" developed by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Convention's special character as a treaty for
the collective enforcement of human rights requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards "practical and effective as opposed to theoretical or
illusory." See, e.g., Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 308 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 35 (1995).
18. See G.A. Res. 57/202, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/202 (Jan. 16, 2003).
19.
As one scholar put it, "the concept of effectiveness has received relatively little
attention" in legal scholarship and writing, "whose principal aim is the description of the valid
norms of a legal system." See Pablo E. Navarro, Legal Positivism and the Effectiveness of
Norms, 26 RECHTSTHEORIE 223, 224 (1995).
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international law and its role in the progressive move to institutionalism
or "tribunalism. ' This has led to a focus upon binding dispute settlement and the tracing of a trajectory of formal institutional, even
bureaucratic "legalization" as the dominant liberal internationalist styles
and modes of thinking about prescriptions for defining, interpreting, and
promoting compliance.2 ' Recent scholarship attempting a rapprochement
between the disciplines of international law (IL) and international relations (IR) also has struggled with questions of compliance with human
rights standards. The narrowness of this focus, however, has relegated
the question of the political conditions of the emergence of human rights
norms, institutions, and doctrines, and especially of the role of power
asymmetries in conditioning distributive outcomes, to the background.
International human rights lawyers like Alston have located the work of
effectiveness instead in matters of fit and cultural commensurability, noting "that certain inconsistencies between provisions of international
instruments and those of regional instruments might raise difficulties
with regard to their implementation. 23
This disciplinary depoliticization through the "effectiveness" agenda
of reform is largely due to the fact that members of human rights institutions and tribunals spend relatively little time exploring the
jurisprudential and social impact of their decisions-that is, cognitively
mapping and systematically articulating the normative bases for and implications of their choice of whether or not to engage in dialogue with
other courts.24 The role of variables such as power, hegemony, socialization, identity, culture, and knowledge in shaping effectiveness and in
20.
For a critical analysis of the origins and development of institutionalism, see David
Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841 (1987). See also Thomas
Skouteris, The New Tribunalism: Strategies of (De)Legitimation in the Era of International
Adjudication, 2006 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 334-39 (discussing the role of the intema-

tional lawyer in the "new tribunalism," i.e., the inter-war rise of international adjudication).
21.
See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401,
401-02 (2000) (explaining legalization theory generally). See generally LEGALIZATION AND
WORLD POLITICS (J.L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001).

22.

JACK L. GOLDSMITH

& ERIC A.

POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

107-

34 (2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) [hereinafter Goodman & links, How to
Influence States]; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights
Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2003) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, Measuringthe Effects
of Human Rights Treaties]; Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make A Difference?, III YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). See generally THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999) (discussing
the domestic impact of international human rights norms).
23.
See Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, 245 (quoting G.A. Res. 47/125, pmbl. 9,
U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/125 (Dec. 18, 1992)).
24.
Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for
the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING, supra note 13, at 15, 39-40.
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capturing the methodological complexities and distributional consequences involved in cross-cultural formation of human rights norms has
rarely been studied methodically in the scholarly literature. Legal scholars often view these as largely irrelevant to their profession. Political
science theorists, for their part, have not considered these issues matter
fit for study outside the occasional grasp of regime theory.5
An attempt to engage with some of these issues was made in recent
years in the context of comparative assessments of the structure and
functioning of supranational courts "as a means of generating a
framework for understanding the effectiveness of [supranational] adjudication., 26 This approach is interesting, as it emphasizes the role of
adjudication in effective systems of regulation and governance, and in
doing so censures the dominance of regime theory in this line of socioscientific research. 7 Yet unlike both macro- and micro-level analyses of
human rights, which have focused largely on the receiving end of the
process of norm-production and transmission, the approach is also original, because it is directly concerned with the process itself.
This Article attempts to expose and problematize the ideological
connections and normative commitments between these theoretical explanations of effectiveness and the pragmatic process-oriented proposals
made in the 1990s when the United Nations was searching for ways to
renew the discipline of international human rights law while avoiding the
dual risks of politicization and Third World normative fragmentation.
The liberal theory of effective supranational adjudication was the culmination of decade-long efforts by American liberal internationalists to
25.

Regime theory is the study of "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,

and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given [issue
area]." See STEPHEN KRASNER, INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2 (1983). For works on human
rights in this tradition, see generally Jack Donnelly, InternationalHuman Rights: A Regime
Analysis, 40 INT'L ORG. 599 (1986); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in PostwarEurope, 45 INT'L ORG. 217 (2000).
26.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter & Alec Stone, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Adjudication, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 91, 91 (1995).

27.
Heifer and Slaughter claimed to "have developed the ... compilation of the attributes of effective supranational adjudication by distilling commentary and analysis by judges,
lawyers, and political scientists who have closely observed the workings of the [European
Court of Justice, ECJ] and the [ECtHR], supplementing these findings with [their] own analysis" which they summarized in a "checklist." See Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Toward A Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107

YALE

L.J. 273, 298 (1997)

[hereinafter Helfer & Slaughter, Theory]. Among the spectrum of attributes are factors such as
the extent to which the court/tribunal engages in judicial cross-fertilization and dialogue; the
existence of autonomous domestic institutions that are committed to the rule of law and responsive to citizen interests; and the relative cultural and political homogeneity of states
subject to the tribunal's jurisdiction. Id. at 300-35. Crucially, the purpose of generating such a
"checklist" was "to develop a tool that [could] be used to assess the effectiveness of other
supranational tribunals and to guide the members of those tribunals in seeking to enhance their
own effectiveness." Id. at 298 (emphasis added).

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 31:307

provide a theoretical basis for and programmatic proposals towards
achieving a more "effective" international human rights regime. Their
theory aims at structuring the interface between the universal and regional human rights systems through a reconfigured account of
"transjudicialism." It can be taken to exemplify a particular liberal legal
sensibility shared with post-war mainstream human rights lawyers I call
"transnationalism-legal-process-antiformalism" (TLPAF).2 ' TLPAF regards transnational governance through disaggregated processes of
cooperation and dialogue in information exchange as instrumental to the
development and effectiveness of supranational institutions. Formalist
legal structures are, accordingly, rebuffed and displaced by the specification and enforcement of substantive human rights norms through
informal, teleological procedural mechanisms.
I shall argue in this Article that TLPAF has important distributive
consequences that are ignored in these theorists' purportedly "neutral,"
process-based analyses. In such a reconfiguration, the Third World and
non-European regional human rights systems are reduced to sites of
norm consumption and norm internalization that have no impact on
norm production. An examination of how the liberal approach to adjudication fits within this broader analytic of TLPAF will necessarily reveal
its limits. It will also point to an urgent need to reconstruct the transjudicial human rights landscape around political alternatives to liberalism in
the discipline's professional self-understanding."
28.
David Kennedy has used the expression "Transnationalism-Legal-ProcessLiberalism" to describe the new mainstream consensus in the discipline of international law
that emerged in the United States in the 1990s, contrasting it with dissident voices both on the
right (public choice theorists) and on the left (scholars of identity politics). Formally, this new
consensus is articulated around a commitment to core ideas of which the following are a sampling: disaggregation of international law; blurring of the law/politics; national/international
and public/private distinctions; anti-formalism; interdisciplinarity; a chastened economics with
a humane face; embedded law and civil society; universal humanism; defense of an ethic of
universal human rights (process, procedure, and machinery rather than formal legal entitlements); use of national courts to enforce human rights norms; championing of liberal world
public order; skepticism about neo-liberalism; worry about governance; regimes and global
management; and enthusiasm about efforts to dialogue and understand the "other." See David
Kennedy, The Twentieth-Century Discipline of International Law in the United States, in
LOOKING BACK AT LAw's CENTURY

386, 406-07, 419-21 (Austin Sarat et al.
eds., 2002). In

this Article, the use of the neighboring expression "Transnationalism-Legal-Process-AntiFormalism" is intended to stress that it is less the autonomy of rational actors than a relentless
insistence on a reinvigorated anti-formalism and detached processualism that distinguishes
transjudicialism theorists from public or rational choice theorists.
29.
Taking the "external point of view" as it were, as opposed to a phenomenological
stance such as the one adopted in this Article, would condemn us to focus on some behavioral
regularities (supposedly induced by norms) and establish some correlations. See Friedrich V.
Kratochwil, How Do Norms Matter?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 35,
63 (Michael Byers ed., 2000) ("Although we may observe a certain regularity that might be
caused by some underlying norm, we have no clear idea how this hunch can be translated into
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Drawing on various strands of IR theory, critical social and legal
theory, feminist relational theory, and the psychology of linguistics, the
Article develops a cognitive model of the interplay between supranational tribunals adjudicating human rights, sketching only the bare bones
of the framework in which this interaction is situated. It is impossible to
fully comprehend this interaction and its relation to human rights' core
problematic of engaging and bridging cultural differences unless one
factors in two elements: first, a displacement of a rationalist interestbased calculus as a progressive human rights narrative; and, second, a
commitment to a more robust communicative conception that focuses on
identity formation and transformation as the governing logic of institution-to-institution, and institution-to-domestic social actor dialogue. It is
not possible to construe a grand theory of human rights cross-cultural
fertilization and norm-internalization in unitary terms because every method of coordination of different plural legal orders is bound to some a
priori ideological premises about social ordering.3 ° The Article also begins to fill an important gap in the growing IL/IR scholarship on
compliance by proposing a relational theoretical framework for understanding how norms influence domestic regulators, and how culture and
rights structure patterns of interaction and relationships between social
actors and norm-enunciators. These, in turn, affect in various ways the
practice of international institutions, state decisions to comply with human rights norms, and their varying levels of compliance.
Part I begins by broadly sketching the methodological shortcomings
and biases of transjudicialism theorists' "convergence thesis." According
to this thesis, jurisprudential convergence, rather than divergence, is
conducive to supranational human rights courts' effectiveness.3' Pulling
together various strands of transjudicialism scholarship over the past
twenty years, it then canvasses what I call the dominant "interactional"
models of international rulemaking and compliance in IRIL theory, and
introduces the theoretical-methodological sketch of "judicial sociodiscursive interactionism" (JSDI). Interactional models recognize that
legal norms help construct national and local identities and interests
through a relational process of justificatory discourse and persuasion,
a causal mechanism so that we can establish the actual aetiology between norms and resulting

behaviour.").
30.
As Frankenberg reminds us, a will to power and governance in comparativist studies of attempts to engage with cultural difference and cultural diversity is routinely denied and
only made implicit in the underlying analyses. See Gunther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking ComparativeLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L. 411, 441-42 (1985).
31.
See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 195-212 (2004) [hereinafter
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER] (on prescriptions for government networks to create
convergence and informed divergence to contribute to the construction of an "effective world
order"); Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 374-75; Part H, infra.
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while JSDI emphasizes how such relational knowledge-production seeks
to foster social relationships conducive to the realization of particular
values in human rights. Taking cross-fertilization and norminternalization seriously must, then, imply unveiling the "billiard ball"
conception of courts and judges as fixed units with a pre-determined
configuration of interests to examine the impact of identity-building
within and across adjudicatory bodies themselves,32 which are harnessed
to local cultural forces. But it must also focus on the distributive effects
of these processes of identity-formation and transformation.
Part IIexplores the politics of prescriptions to policymakers for designing "effective" supranational human rights adjudication. The Article
then tests these assumptions in Part III through a highly contextual case
study on the death penalty. This study illustrates how arguments about
human rights regime effectiveness and judicial cross-fertilization conceal
important distributive stakes and the blind spots of the underlying exclusionary analyses of human rights normativity. A brief conclusion
follows.
I. "NEWNESS" IN THE RISE OF A "GLOBAL COMMUNITY
OF HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS"

The liberal internationalist "thought-experiment"33 of transjudicialism in relation to the development of human rights norms and
institutions must be understood in the historical context of the rise and
hegemony in post-war American international legal thought of the
broader liberal approach to international adjudication on which it
draws.34 For international lawyers, it is commonplace, even passi, that
Anne-Marie Slaughter has sought over the years to construct a distinctive liberal theory of international law which complements liberal
32.
See generally Alastair lain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social
Environments, 45 INT'L STUD. Q. 487 (2001). See also ORAN R. YOUNG, GOVERNANCE IN
WORLD AFFAIRS 149-53 (1999) (discussing endogenous and exogenous forces within the
institutions themselves, including the role of ideas and processes of social learning for affecting behavior).
33.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 503, 505 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, Liberal States].
34.
Little attempt has been made in human rights scholarship to unravel TLPAF's ideological assumptions and the normative implications to which it is wedded. To the extent that
human rights lawyers engage with liberal internationalist literature, the result turns out to be a
dialogue wholly internal to liberal cosmopolitans (generalists and specialists) and a wholesale
borrowing of the theoretical and pragmatic insights generated by these studies. See Gerald L.
Neuman, Talking to Ourselves, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 139, 142 (2005) (arguing that
"[i]ntemational human rights law needs to persuade outsiders and to leave space for reciprocal
critique" and that "[e]asing conversation among human rights lawyers is not a sufficient objective").
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international relations theory, in response to the realist challenge, and
through a focus on the role of adjudication by domestic courts in establishing an internationalrule of law.35 As will be argued in Part I.B infra,
liberal international legal theory does not, however, disrupt either realists' or rational choice theorists' reification of state and judicial
identities, nor their displacement of the cultural processes through which
these identities are shaped and distributed. In that sense, it could be seen
as their ideological heir rather than as their opponent despite, or rather
precisely because of, its legal process orientation.
Building upon Andrew Moravcsik's "positive" liberalism 3 6 and distancing herself from the pitfalls of quixotic post-war Wilsonian liberal
internationalism, Slaughter argued that state preferences are neither fixed
nor autonomous but are the aggregation of individual and group preferences and interests, and that these preferences are the primary
determinants of what states do.37 Accordingly, "how States behave depends on how they are internally constituted."38 Liberal theory assumes
that liberal states-that is, those having some form of representative
government, constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights, and a
judicial system dedicated to the rule of law-will comply more readily
with the treaties they sign and that these treaties are more likely to be
subject to effective judicial enforcement at the international or domestic
level (or both).39 This theory also assumes that judges from these states
are more likely to build a transnational community of law through an
increased readiness to cite one another.40
Liberal theory offers a rather sanguine vision of the constitution of a
"global community of law," which takes account of the realities of globalization by seeking to ground international law in the realism of the
domestic rather than the false utopianism of international institutions 4 It
35.
In addition to the texts cited in this Article, the following can be considered Slaughter's most representative works on her liberal theory of international law: Anne-Marie Burley,
Toward an Age of Liberal Nations, 33 HARV INT'L L.J. 393 (1992); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
The Liberal Agenda for Peace: InternationalRelations Theory and the Future of the United
Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 377 (1994).
36.
See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking PreferencesSeriously: A Liberal Theory of InternationalPolitics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 516-24 (1997).
37.
Slaughter, LiberalStates, supra note 33, at 507-08.
38.
Id. at 537.
39.
Id. at 530, 533-34. For a well-known, acerbic critique of this thesis, see Jos6 E.
Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critiqueof Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EuR.
J. INT'L L. 183 (2001). See also Outi Korhonen, Liberalism and InternationalLaw: A Centre
Projectinga Periphery,65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 481 (1996).
40.
Slaughter, Liberal States, supra note 33, at 533-34.
41.
But see Alex Mills & Tim Stephens, Challenging the Role of Judges in Slaughter's
Liberal Theory of International Law, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1, 16-23 (2005) (arguing that
Slaughter's theory fails to correspond with the reality of transnational judicial communication
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does not, however, aspire to a world government enforcing a monolithic
rule of law, for it perceives such government as threatening individual
liberty. 2 Instead, it defends the rise of loosely organized "regulatory
networks" 3 of municipal courts, heralded as "new" and irresistible initiatives, as an increasingly important component of global governance."
Building on a "presumption of an integrated legal system ' 45 and a claim
to "newness," these institutions are said to overlap, engage in crossfertilization, and apply a complex array of domestic and transnational
laws with global implications due to the rapid mobility of people, capital, and services across borders in the new global political economy and
the resultant overlapping and interchangeability of identities and values.
The underlying premise of TLPAF as an approach to global governance, as briefly mentioned above, assumes the power of reason, dignity,
and equality, as well as the intrinsic value of widespread and diverse in-

among domestic courts, and hence fails to respond to the challenge of realist theories of international adjudication).
42.
Slaughter thus resembles contemporary neo-Kantians who have attempted a more
sophisticated reconstruction of Kant's republican cosmopolitanism as a distinct philosophy of
international law. See FERNANDO R. TEs6N, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 17
(1998). For a survey of recent works, see Patrick Capps, The Kantian Project in Modem International Legal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1003 (2001) (book review, reviewing TEs6N,
supra).
43.
Regulatory network scholarship is a body of work analyzing the rise of government
networks, or networks of government interaction which are "principally horizontal, relatively
informal, and driven by the basic need of government officials in one country to interact with
their counterparts in another to regulate increasingly mobile and global private actors." See
Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Zaring, Networking Goes International:An Update, 2 ANN.
REV. L. Soc. Sci. 211, 215 (2005). One question animating the work of network theorists such
as Slaughter concerns the conditions under which regulatory networks are likely to be effective. Effectiveness is hardly ever defined in this literature. It appears that what these theorists
have in mind is the extent to which networks are able to disseminate, interpret, and generate
new standards and new meaning of credible information on best practices through increased
interaction; identify problems created by the absence of coordination on important policy
questions in given issue-areas (as a result of lack of credible information) and "for which the
formation of a network is an optimal solution" ("complex coordination and deliberation problems"); and explore and evaluate optimal solutions to these complex coordination problems.
Id. at 219-20.
44.
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 67. It is not entirely clear
whether this characterization refers to a difference in kind or merely one of degree. As Slaughter argues elsewhere, "[t]he fruits of such interaction could be envisaged as networks of
institutions, or of institutionalized relations, that would emulate the form and substance of a
world government without in fact transcending or displacing nation-states." Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Typology of TransjudicialCommunication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 136 (1995)
[hereinafter Slaughter, Typology].
45.
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 86.
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put in a deliberative process to a tribunal's effectiveness. ' The point is
"less to borrow than to benefit from comparative deliberation." 47 Thus,
[b]y communicating with one another in a form of collective deliberation about common legal questions, these tribunals can
reinforce each other's legitimacy and independence from political interference. They can also promote a global conception of
the rule of law, acknowledging its multiple historically and culturally contingent manifestations but affirming a core of
common meaning. 1
A global idea of law and the rule of law are presented as objective,
agnostic, and neutral, with a shared understanding of law's core meaning, rather than contingent on historical and cultural exclusions. Two
pivotal historical and cultural tales about the effectiveness of human
rights tribunals are relied upon in support of this claim. The first portrays
European courts as being historically effective and non-European human
rights systems as ineffective and thus relies on an effective/ineffective
dichotomy. Europe has a longer tradition of human rights norms, protection, and enforcement. Its jurisprudence is also richer, making it not only
more useful but also determinative for any empirical inquiry into the
constitution of norms and identities that will systematically yield conclusions on compliance, effectiveness, etc. The tribunals selected in
subsequent effectiveness analyses are heavily weighted in favor of judicial dialogue, while those which are not (non-European courts) are
simply discounted.49 The theory's claim to universal applicability thus
rests on an explicit Eurocentric selection bias.50 In addition, the liberal
46.

See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY

(Frederick G. Lawrence trans., 1987) (1985); JORGEN HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger trans., 1989) (1969).
47.
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 75.
48.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 282; see also Anne-Marie Slaughter,
The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AF. 183, 189 (1997).
49.
Transjudicialism theorists have made no qualms about, this Eurocentric disposition.
They argue that from the perspective of political science research methodology, they have
"selected on the dependant variable, focusing only on two relatively effective tribunals rather
than correlating explanatory factors with a range of effective and less effective tribunals."
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 299. Thus, they "sought only to make the case
that the ECJ and ECHR were more effective than other international tribunals and to develop
hypotheses as to why this might be the case." Laurence Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why
States Create International Tribunals:A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 93 CAL. L.
REv. 899, 918 (2005) [hereinafter Helfer & Slaughter, Response].
50.
Selection bias occurs when a researcher intentionally or inadvertently "select[s]
observations on the basis of combinations of the independent and dependent variables that
support the desired conclusion." See GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 128 (1994); David Collier & James Mahoney,
Insights and Pitfalls:Selection Bias in QualitativeResearch, 49 WORLD POL. 56, 59 (1996).
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discourse of a "global community of human rights courts" treats judicial
dialogue as contingent on the existence of "thin" liberal features borrowed from domestic constitutionalism-"the existence (in states subject
to the jurisdiction of a supranational tribunal) of domestic government
institutions committed to the rule of law, responsive to the claims of individual citizens, and able to formulate and pursue their interests
independently from other government institutions"5 . This tracks similar
patterns of cultural exclusion stemming from reified and static identity
conceptions of adjudicators. The theory neglects the power of principled
ideas, identities, and norms produced by supranational institutions
through the exercise of tremendous governmental power. It also downplays the identity-constitutive role of local contestation and cognitive
culture as a measure of both judicial cross-fertilization and effectiveness. 52
A. A Genealogy of JudicialDialogue: Disempowering
Non-EuropeanRegionalism
The shift in international human rights discourse to "effectiveness"
orthodoxy has involved an investigation into a tribunal's "ability to compel compliance with its judgments by convincing domestic government
institutions, directly and through pressure from private litigants, to use
their power on its behalf."53 As a result of the collapse of the domestic/supranational distinction stemming from this externalization of
liberal domestic constitutional politics, the boundaries between descriptive and prescriptive postures of liberal theorists towards effective
supranational human rights adjudication have been blurred." It was believed that the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), a quasi-judicial
body, could enhance its effectiveness by behaving more like a court and

51.
Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 333-34.
52.
Omitted variable bias occurs when an apparent correlation between a dependent
variable (effectiveness) and independent variable (judicial cross-fertilization) actually reflects
the correlation between the dependent variable and another independent variable that happens
to be (partially) correlated with the independent variable used. See KiNG ET AL., supra note
50, at 168-69; see also Kratochwil, supra note 29, at 53.
53.
Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 278, 290. Elsewhere, Slaughter
adopted a similar definition, but using an analogy to the impact of judgments issued by domestic courts. See Slaughter & Stone, supra note 26, at 92. In later work however, Heifer and
Slaughter have acknowledged the precariousness of any definition of effectiveness, stating that
theirs was "more relative than absolute." See Helfer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at
918.
54.
Robert 0. Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT'L ORG. 457, 478-79 (2000) (positing that liberal democracies will be more
receptive to efforts to "embed international law in domestic legal systems").
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"helping to construct a global community of law."5 This was to be
achieved in two ways: on the one hand, through a more nurtured and
sustained dialogue with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
"as the first step in an effort to build a global community of law" 6 beyond Europe and, on the other, by harmonizing its decisions through "a
policy of thoughtful convergence with European jurisprudence, supplemented by informed divergence where there are justifiable and
articulated reasons for doing so.' ',5 The case for convergence with European jurisprudence, due to its supposed potential to assist in the U.N.
rights-protection enhancement agenda,58 has been mirrored in the attempt
to rationalize it on grounds of institutional "effectiveness."5' 9
The correspondence between these two strategies is not accidental.
Its impact, however, is most discernable when examining how arguments
about convergence have been deployed in transjudicialism scholarship.
"Convergence" is most evident in this literature in the "slow, but pervasive processes of normalization of a hegemonic ideology."6 The
European system, in all its avowed specificity, is somehow universal and
55.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 381. Even Makau wa Mutua, a vocal
figure among Third World Approaches to International Law scholars, appears to have been
ultimately seduced by the liberal internationalists' proposal in his own thinking about the
construction of the African Human Rights system. He earlier took issue with the purportedly
apolitical and objectively neutral nature of their checklist of elements conducive to tribunal
effectiveness, claiming that they urge "the identification of universally generalizable European
experiences so that they can be transplanted to institutions outside Europe," with the HRC and
the ICCPR relegated to "the role of toddling works in progress, projects which must be reared
by the more mature intellectual, spiritual, and institutional European parents." See Makau wa
Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for De-MarginalizingEnforcement, 4 BuFF. H.R. L. REv. 211, 240-41 (1998) (hereinafter Mutua, Looking Past the
Human Rights Committee]. By a year later, however, Mutua had recanted his admonishment
of Helfer and Slaughter's proposal, suggesting that the checklist "can be particularly useful if
judges are independent and motivated by the drive to make the African Human Rights Court
the central institution in the development of a legal culture based on the rule of law." See Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights Court: A Two-Legged Stool?, 21 HuM. RTs Q. 342,
362 (1999).
56.
Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 367.
57.
Id. at 374. Divergences are said to be justified only if based on "textual or other
differences between the two treaties" (ICCPR and ECHR). Id. The present Article refers to
this argument as the "convergence thesis," as the proposal appears to create a presumption in
favor of converging jurisprudence rather than divergence as a measure of a regime's effectiveness. See also Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3,
239, 251.
58.
Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, 248.
59.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 281-82. This rapprochement should
not, however, be exaggerated. Elsewhere Alston has strongly criticized the organizational
structure of government networks, which Slaughter and others have described as a nonaccountable, elitist network of experts, and their dominant role in shaping decision-making in
the global economy. Philip Alston, The Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers
and Globalization, 8 EuR. J. INT'L L. 435, 441-42 (1997).
60.
See Nico Krisch, InternationalLaw in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the
Shaping of the InternationalLegal Order, 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 369, 404 (2005).
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persuasive for other regional (and even U.N.-based) human rights systems. Yet "[o]nce the ideas of the centre have been recognized as valid
by the periphery" 6 -- operating under something akin to the influence of
a judicialized "standard of civilization"-"the impression of domination
disappears entirely., 62 The overall direction of such influence, however,
becomes less linear than "agonistic."63
Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have argued that social objectivity, being constituted through acts of power, is ultimately political and
has to show the traces of exclusion that govern its constitution.64 This
point of convergence-or rather mutual collapse-between objectivity
and power is what they mean by "hegemony."65 In her own work, Mouffe
distinguishes agonism from mere "antagonism," or destructive conflict
characteristic of Schmittian thought, by stressing the inevitability of conflict in political life, yet the impossibility of closure-that is, defining
social reality through final, rational, and neutral decision procedures because of the ubiquity of power and the plurality of values. 66 The primacy
of power over morality and hegemony over free will, which are inherent
to agonistic politics, can be observed, for instance, in the spread of
American and European ideas of the separation of powers, due process,
and the rule of law, and the widely publicized strong role of domestic
courts in safeguarding them.67 Power, however, is constituted and mobilized through struggle in the shaping of objectified judicial and local
identities rather than eliminated. This is because judges seek hegemony,
or the dominance of their preferred world-view, which also means call61.

Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Works on agonistic politics range from liberal democratic discourse to more critical
"rationalist" accounts of deliberation or "conflict theory," or from Habermas to Marx at one
extreme to the more radicalist Gramscian and post-Marxist democratic politics of Chantal
Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau on the other. The understanding adopted in this Article is much
closer to the latter, and draws more generally on the classic sketch of "agonistic thinking" in

the following works: HoMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 33 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing "agonism" and "liminality"); CHANTAL MouFFE, THE DEMOCRACY PARADOX (2000);
CHANTAL MOUFFE

&

ERNESTO LACLAU, HEGEMONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY: TOWARDS A

RADICAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICS ch. 3 (2001) (discussing "overdetermination" and "antagonism"); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM ch. 3 (1993) (discussing "writing
back"); Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: POWER: THE ESSENTIAL FOUCAULT

64.

326-49 (1997).

63, at 122-27.
65.
Id. at 134-44.
66.
MouFFE,supra note 63, at 101-04.
67.
See Ugo Mattei, A Theory of Imperial Law: A Study on U.S. Hegemony and the
Latin Resistance, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 383, 416-25 (2003); Krisch, supra note 60.
One can trace this development of the spread of European laws towards "progress" and a universal normative order back to Kant's political writings. See e.g., Immanuel Kant, Idea for a
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784), in IMMANUEL KANT, POLITICAL
WRITINGS 52 (H.S. Reiss, ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991).
MOUFFE & LACLAU, supra note
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ing into question the dominant hegemony itself. American and European
court decisions are increasingly cited on these and other liberal issues
around the world,68 especially in former imperial colonies, while efforts
at resisting this circulation of ideas are seen as deviations from the norm
and are thus rendered pathological in the literature. Similar moves are
unfolding in the resolute attempt by liberalism to bring changes to the
self-understanding and self-perception of non-European supranational
court judges adjudicating human rights, in order to facilitate gradual acceptance of European concepts and standards.' International human
rights law thus becomes a discursive process by which particulars combine to produce something that can function as universal.7 °
In this progressive tale about supranational courts gradually achieving effectiveness, an essentialized European human rights community is
pitted against an ineffective law developed by non-European tribunals.
At the same time, it is presented as seeking to expand its reach beyond
Europe. 71 Liberal theorists harbor stronger intellectual affinities with the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and ECtHR's modes of judicial reasoning
68.
The burgeoning literature builds on the classical statements in the following works:
Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
ConstitutionalInterpretation,74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, JudicialGlobalization].
69.
On the historical drive of the international legal order toward homogenization and
unity-toward the "inclusion" of the third world other by leading this order to believe in the
superior quality of the colonizers' practices and rules--originating with the Spanish conquest
of the Indies and its justification in the works of Vitoria, see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 28, 108, 310-11 (2005). Anghie's
germinal thinking has greatly influenced the writing of this part of the Article. See also Korhonen, supra note 39, at 502, 523-24.
70.
A global community of law, as the offshoot of a ius publicum europeanum (European public law), thus fundamentally rests on a paradox: "In order to attain equality, the
non-European community must accept Europe as its master-but to accept a master was proof
that one was not equal." MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE
RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960, at 136 (2002).
71.
Slaughter asserts that such borrowing between domestic constitutional courts "runs
in both directions-from the developed world to the developing world and back again"--but,
to date, has provided little empirical evidence to buttress her claim. See Anne-Marie Slaughter
& William Burke-White, The Future of InternationalLaw Is Domestic (or The European Way
of Law), 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 327, 336 n.38 (2006); see also Alvarez, supra note 39, at 21420; Mills & Stephens, supra note 41, at 18-23. The difficulty resides in the fact that her theory
rests on instances where domestic constitutional courts explicitly cite the judgments of foreign
national courts, or the judgments of supranational tribunals (with the exception of the socalled "vertical dialogue" between the ECtHR and ECJ). Not surprisingly, then, she concentrates on those types of transnational interactions which exemplify and amplify the liberal
paradigm and ontologically privilege liberal states by using their institutions and political
tendencies as the empirical reference point. Dialogue between the Human Rights Committee
(HRC) and the ECtHR is seen as merely adding a layer of supranationalism to increasing
dialogue among judges from domestic courts of liberal nations. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 217 (2003) [hereinafter Slaughter,
Courts].
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and interpretative methodologies which they consider superior.7" The
claim to "newness" of the rise of a global community of law beyond
Europe through judicial dialogue accordingly rests on a familiar form of
colonialist and imperialist narrative." "Dialogue" ideology has shaped
the very modes of professional discourse and debate about legal pluralism from the time of their origins-for, as some commentators have
recorded, phenomena of cross-fertilization and transplanted plural legal
orders were pervasive among the courts of imperial powers and their
colonies.74 These have had implications for the work of reconceptualizing and renewing the fundamental normative structures of international
human rights undertaken by post-Cold War human rights lawyers and
transjudicialism theorists. The European success story that liberal theorists have sought to transpose in extra-European contexts and portrayed
as empowering and liberating for non-European systems seeking to become more "effective" appears in the disciplinary story as the "gentle
civilizer" of socio-culturally differentiated subjects: the much glorified
tale of two supranational tribunals operating within a select club of liberal democracies with strong domestic commitments to the rule of law.75
Such historically sanitized visions of "effectiveness" are hardly the
result of judicial dialogue but rather condition it. They rely on deeply
ingrained experience, political design, and collective culture that are peculiar to the specificities of European colonial and imperial history.
Slaughter and Laurence Helfer are of course not alien to this, concluding
in 1997 that
the existence (in states subject to the jurisdiction of a supranational tribunal) of domestic government institutions committed
72.
Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 276, 290-97; see also Anne-Marie
Slaughter & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration,
47 INT'L ORG. 41, 58 (1993).
73.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 377-86.
74.
See generally LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES
IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400-1900 (2002). The legal pluralist literature on this point is vast. For
an excellent overview, see Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 869,
872-75 (1988) (citing sources). See also Reem Bahdi, Globalizationof Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of InternationalLaw in Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 555, 597-602 (2002); Hannah L. Buxbaum, From Empire to Globalization ... and

Back?: A Post-Colonial View of Transjudicialism, 11

IND.

J.

GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.

183

(2004); Krisch, supra note 60, at 400-02.
75.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 370 (claiming that "a true community
of law is likely to be limited, at least in the short and medium term, to a group of countries or
regions with a strong tradition of the rule of law"); see also id. at 391 (claiming that
"'[e]ffective supranational adjudication'. . . has been achieved in large measure in at least one
region in the world, for many distinctly non-utopian reasons" and that "[tihe search for those
reasons and the effort to formulate them as preconditions is as likely to yield pessimistic prognoses for some regions as it is to bolster the prospects for others").
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to the rule of law, responsive to the claims of individual citizens,
and able to formulate and pursue their interests independently
from other government institutions, is a strongly favorable precondition for effective supranational adjudication.76
Yet to consolidate and extend the universal stranglehold of the European experiment, these attributes "may even be a necessary (although
not sufficient)
condition for maximizing effective supranational adjudi77
cation.,
In developing a model of why some institutions are more effective
than others, those attempted by "mixed" groups of states such as the
HRC, or by non-European states such as the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACtHR), are enlisted as relatively "ineffective. 78 The
supranational judicial world is thus divided between "effective" and "ineffective" human rights systems, a mere shorthand for the nineteenthcentury distinction between "civilized" and "uncivilized," which then
justified "dialogue" between imperial courts and those of the colonies.
This move is critical for understating both the civilizing mission of
transjudicialism theorists' project and these regional systems' conceptual
self-understanding and identity-building. If the European experience is
effective while others' are not, the history of non-European human rights
systems can only be one of gradual incorporation (convergence) of
cultural differences into an "international" human rights law which, paradoxically, is explicitly European, and, at the same time, universal,
secular, and broadly inclusive. Each attempt to perforate and reconfigure
the peripheries of the global community of law "irritates" and leads to
the creation of further differences that need to be bridged through everincreasing norm-internalizations.
76.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 333-34.
77.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 71, at 352;
Daniel S. Sullivan, Effective InternationalDispute Settlement Mechanisms and the Necessary
Condition of LiberalDemocracy, 81 GEt. L.J. 2369, 2374-87 (1993).
78.
Slaughter, Liberal States, supra note 33, at 515. Such a claim is also routinely made
about the Inter-American, African, and U.N. human rights systems. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of InternationalHuman Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar

Europe, 54 INT'L ORG. 217, 219 (2000) (referring to the U.N. human rights system as "a notably weak r6gime"); Andrew Moravcsik, Explaining International Human Rights Regimes:
Liberal Theory and Western Europe, 1 EuR. J. INT'L REL. 157, 159, 178-81 (1995) (examining conditions under which effective human rights regimes are likely to emerge and
concluding that the relative success of the European regime and ineffectiveness of the InterAmerican system is best explained by factors endogenous to the countries concerned). For a
critique of the view holding that the African human rights system is "ineffective" see generally OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: ACTIVIST FORCES,
AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2007).
79.
See generally Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants:Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998). For a useful
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The instrumentalization of the doctrine of effectiveness at the helm
of the U.N. human rights reform era in the 1990s has helped bridge cultural differences and create a legal regime that, once lifted outside the
domestic jurisdiction of states, could both pragmatically and philosophically account for relations between the European and non-European
human rights systems. In this connection, rights discourse came to play a
very powerful legitimating role. Rights language connects the objectives
sought through reforms to much greater policy goals, giving these reforms "an aura of authority and legitimacy" and suggesting that they
actually "provide protection against the abuse of the powerful."' Pragmatic proposals tying institutional effectiveness to enhanced human
rights enforcement and protection, coupled with prescriptions for normative convergence, could thus lead to further marginalizing, rather than
empowering, non-European human rights systems.
Demobilization of non-European human rights courts and judges
through dialogue ideology has operated on two levels. First, the ethic of
cross-fertilization, coherence, and convergence advocated by these academics and practitioners amounted to perpetuating a strict paternalism
with which critical Third World internationalists like Anghie have been
concerned in recent years." In the postcolonial and supranational contexts, this pattern of judicial influence should be understood as subtly
"received" by judges from these courts through the play of what Edward
Said calls "contrapuntal ensembles ' 2 rather than imposed on them
through coercion. By this Said means the complex, mutually constitutive
power relations through interaction, appropriation, negotiation, and resistance jarred with ambivalence that animate any work of cultural
production.83 Such ambivalent relational patterns of judicial influence
become more difficult to record and rationalize the further away one
moves from the statist paradigms of law-creation and law-application
sociological description of the structural effect of the center/periphery divide (which I use as a
proxy for the effective/ineffective chasm) in international human rights law on the globalized
world and the argument that our practices, institutions, and conceptual frameworks help to
sustain it, see BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SciENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION 327-73 (1995).
80.

KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING

RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND

GENDER IN MARKET REFORM 68 (2002).
81.
ANGHIE, supra note 69.

82.
SAID, supra note 63, at 50-51.
83.
Id. Benton similarly argues that colonial jurisdictional claims extended by colonizers over conquered people were crafted in the terms of structured legal pluralism well-known
to colonizers, who were already formally plural. This, in turn, led colonized people to perceive
the possibility of using these tensions "at home" to their advantage in colonial settings and
devised legal strategies that exploited them, ranging from assimilation, accommodation, advocacy within the system, and subtle de-legitimation to outright rebellion. See BENTON, supra
note 74, at 2-3, 13.
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already fixed in mainstream human rights and positivist international
legal scholarship, as well as in liberal theory's insistence on the distinction between liberal and non-liberal states. Second, arguments about
effectiveness behoove human rights institution designers and norm
enunciators to take into account the distinction between liberal democracies and other states in fashioning institutional identity and reforming
and designing global institutions." It is only by holding the political and
legal conditions prevailing in the states subject to a tribunal's jurisdiction constant through time and space that judicial dialogue could aspire
to be associated in any causal sense with a tribunal's effectiveness. 86 By
the operation of these two techniques, instances where judges of tribunals with a non-European or mixed membership (Latin America and
Africa) resisted dialogue (through direct references or not) with judges
of European courts are excluded or discounted in the analysis. That
non-European human rights systems are "ineffective" because of lower
84.
For a similar argument in the context of connecting the colonial discourse of rights
in Nigeria to international human rights scholarship, see BONNY IBHAWOH, IMPERIALISM AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: COLONIAL DISCOURSES OF RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN AFRICAN HISTORY 17
(2007).
85.

GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES. UNEQUAL SOVEREIGNS IN

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 305-06 (2004).
86.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 362 (arguing that the HRC's "diversity of membership presents the Committee with challenges that its European counterparts are
less likely to face, challenges that may ultimately circumscribe its potential for becoming fully
effective but that it has nevertheless proven itself prepared to meet"); id. at 365 (further arguing that "[t]he Committee's ability to improve compliance with its judgments will prove an
important test of the cultural and political homogeneity thesis"); see also Mutua, Looking Past
the Human Rights Committee, supra note 55, at 241.
87.
In their study, Helfer and Slaughter provide no examples of instances in which the
ECtHR engaged in dialogue with and borrowed from the HRC, the IACtHR, or the African
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Nor do they explain why such cases of "influence" are lacking. Their model, in addition, provides no analytical tools for assessing when
and why resistance by judges from non-European bodies to engage in dialogue with their
European counterparts occurs.
The ILA's Final Report on the Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights
Treaty Bodies indicates relatively few references to the work of the U.N. treaty bodies in the
jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and even fewer to the case law of the IACtHR. By contrast, the
ILA report shows that the Organization of American States human rights bodies have referred
on relatively more occasions to the work of the ECtHR and of the HRC, although "borrowings" have largely been limited to framework questions of general international law (such as
the requirement to exhaust local remedies, interpretation and admissibility issues, etc.). The
African Commission, despite its comparatively measured experience in adjudicating similar
issues, has sparingly made use of findings of the more established treaty bodies and ECtHR
and has not turned to dialogue to imprint its fledging jurisprudence with a badge of legitimacy.
See 2004 ILA Berlin Report, supra note 16, i 118-37. While the ILA study is somewhat
dated, empirically formalistic, incomplete, and by no means exhausts empirical evidence on
whether dialogue between European and non-European human rights tribunals actually takes
place and on what terms, to the extent it disproves some of the fundamental findings (normatively asserted rather than empirically demonstrated) of transjudicialism theorists about
judicial dialogue and normative convergence, it must be supplemented and reckoned with.
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compliance rates is not an answer and begs the question of whose definition of "effective" ultimately matters, and whose jurisprudence is
relevant for constructing the foundations of the transnational community
of human rights courts.
In recent writings, transjudicialism theorists have recanted their "anti-pluralist" position,88 with an important modification to the second
technique of demobilization mentioned above. Effectiveness is no longer
limited to institutions that operate exclusively in liberal democracies but
rather depends on "the judges' participation in an emerging 'global
community of law,' which [they] defined as 'a community of interests
and ideals shielded by legal language and practice' in which participants
'understand themselves to be linked through their participation in, comprehension of, and responsibility for legal discourse. ' Such a
community is described as "a partially insulated sphere in which legal
actors interact based on common interests and values, protected from
direct political interference." 9 Behind legal process and anti-formalist
rhetoric, discussion is thus evaded on substantive politics. The argument
stresses the primacy of participation of judges in an imagined "preexisting community" shielded from politics in shaping judicial outcomes
rather than the underlying political conditions for "networking" or transnational judicial permeability. The positive claim of liberal theory that
domestic regime-type is a determinant of what judges do and how they
behave is, thereby, effectively turned on its head. Yet despite the sugges88.
Helfer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at 907. Gerry Simpson uses the expression "anti-pluralist" to describe Slaughter's liberal theory of international law. Gerry
Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 537, 538 (2001). According to such a mild
conception, "the distinction between liberal and illiberal states is significant for analytical
purposes, but it does not provide an automatic ground for the exclusion of that state from the
international community or intervention in that state's affairs." Id. at 559. Instead, Slaughter's
theory "seeks to engage with outlaw states using a combination of old-fashioned classical
international law combined with an ambitious private and public transnationalism of networks." Id. at 566.
89.
Helfer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at 907. The other determinant in the
evolution of supranational tribunals is "the judges' skill in identifying domestic constituencies
who could press national governments to comply with the tribunals' rulings." Id. at 908. This
shift in emphasis suggests that some of the factors on the "checklist" for effective supranational human rights adjudication would be impossible for either states or tribunals to control
without limiting the identity of participating states themselves. See Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 391 (arguing that "[m]any of the factors on the checklist, even those
within the power of the tribunals themselves or of the states that create them, may simply be
unattainable"). Thus, the "factors listed toward the bottom of each category in the checklist
[referring to factors within and outside the control of judges] are more context-specific and
likely to vary across different tribunals." Id. at 299. Yet at the same time, it is claimed that
"[t]he factors ... are not culturally or geographically specific; they require political preconditions that are more concentrated in the West but that are themselves the product of a
universalist political ideology and exist in states throughout the world." Id. at 337.
90.
Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 277.
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tion that the distinction between domestic regime-types has been forever
transcended and is no longer critical to the success and failure of effective supranational human rights adjudication, one wonders whether
transjudicialism theorists can escape the normative implications of
Slaughter's descriptive anti-pluralist theory, which she continues to use
in her more recent work on government networks. 9'
An inquiry into judicial dialogue concerned with power distribution
and knowledge production through identity-formation would look, instead, at supranational human rights judges' motives for engaging in
dialogue as competent and professional discoursers sharing the common
cosmopolitan vernacular of "human rights," even in the face of divergent
substantive outcomes. The focus would shift to questions such as: 1)
Who are we? (2) What do we want? (3) How do we get what we want?
and (4) What resources do we need to get what we want? 92 Judicial deliberation confronts all of these simultaneously, bringing considerations
of identity, morality (which good should be achieved collectively), professional ethics, and political pragmatism together in an uncomfortable
synthesis. The liberal paradigm is simply unable to provide a viable
framework for thinking about these issues beyond its European prejudices. The next section of this Article outlines a possible theoretical and
methodological basis for further querying the relationship between judicial dialogue and effective supranational human rights adjudication.
This relationship is complex and contingent. At bottom, it requires
asking whether any account of judicial dialogue can be conceptually coherent, normatively appealing, and pragmatically useful. What are the
reasons for a specific domestic government institution making common
cause with a supranational tribunal's judicial interactions? This necessitates a detailed understanding of and sensitivity to interests, perceptions,
and patterns of expectations and argumentation by a wide range of actors
within specific countries. It requires a more careful examination of what
is implied and what is concealed by the proposition that crossfertilization "would help to contribute to the development of a better, and

91.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199, 228 (Gregory H.
Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000) [hereinafter Slaughter, Networks]; see also Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF
LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 29, at 177; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal
Theory of International Law, 94 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 240, 249 (2000) [hereinafter
Slaughter, Liberal Theory].
92.
These questions are taken from Christian Reus-Smit, The Strange Death of Liberal
InternationalTheory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 573, 575-76 (2001), who applies them to political
deliberation. He refers to these as the identity, purposive, strategic-instrumentalist, and material-instrumentalist question types. Id.
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more sophisticated, human rights jurisprudence." 93 How does such a

claim resonate with domestic institutions and social movements at the
receiving end of vertical channels of communication? 94 To substantiate
the claim of a positive correlation between judicial dialogue and the effectiveness of supranational human rights adjudication, serious empirical
problems of the sort must be overcome. Liberal theory, on the other
hand, moves from the articulation of an explanatory framework to draw
out a package of normative commitments about the kind of effective international human rights law we need.95
The next section of this Article traces and re-codes the "logics of ex-

clusion and inclusion" 96 in transjudicialism theorists' causal explanations
and normative claims. There are important political consequences of
constituting the liberal discourse of TLPAF as the sole emancipatory
vocabulary of human rights cross-fertilization and norm-internalization.
Neither the positive liberal international relations theory on which these
explanations are based, nor these theorists' thin empirical claims about
the dynamics of judicial interaction among human rights courts provide

them with the epistemological resources to make their normative moves
successfully. 97 The need for a global community of human rights law
with Europe at its center for a coherent, well-functioning, and effective
international human rights legal system is simply taken for granted. Yet
the strategies of governance through the expansion of such a community
beyond Europe could appear as much as the nemesis of power as its
93.

Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3, U 239, 248.

94.
Joseph Weiler has called this phenomenon the "per se compliance pull of judicial
dialogue conducted between courts in legalese." See J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The
European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 Comp. POL. STUD. 510, 520-21 (1994);
see also Stephen J. Toope, Emerging Patterns of Governance and InternationalLaw, in THE
ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 29, at 91, 105-07 (on pre-legal or

"contextual" regimes of informal normativity); Kratochwil, supra note 29, at 56.
95.
In all expositions of her theory, Slaughter has not escaped the normative impulse
due to her own split professional identity as a both a lawyer and political scientist. As she

states, "[i]f these hypotheses hold, the next step will be to develop a corresponding set of
norms within each category." See Slaughter, Liberal States, supra note 33, at 515; see also
Slaughter, Networks, supra note 91, at 202, 235.
96.
I borrow this expression from UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 42

(2d ed. 2006).
97.

See also Korhonen, supra note 39, at 491-94, 525. Korhonen argues that liberalism

sustains a vision of itself and of international law's unified modem identity by making the
reality it describes correspond to legal knowledge through predictions about future behavior of
actors in international relations in regulatory systems that are, however, plural and highly

unpredictable. See id. These predictive devices, which aim at diffusion of rules of behavior,
move from pure observation to prescription in creating a positive theory of international law.
In such a behavioral framework, law is not conceptually grounded, and the absence of any
conceptual basis is overcome by borrowing from liberal international relations theory. It re-

mains ultimately questionable how such self-referential reliance on liberal theory can provide
the epistemological foundations for liberalism's underlying predictions.
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handmaiden. The apolitical and ahistorical language of global legal
community obscures the fact that a community may be most "effective"
either when projected outward from a metropolis or as the product of a
de-centered, agonistic dialogical process of cultural governance managed through interactions between a diverse range of judiciaries." The
idea of "effectiveness" becomes hijacked-just like concepts of "good
governance" 99 or "humane governance"'-into a counterinsurgency
agenda to a wide range of oppositional and transformative social projects
in international human rights law.'0 ' As further discussed below in relation to the conceptualization of judicial interactions in rationalistic
economic terms by liberal theorists, a global community of law may be
nothing more than a neo-colonial construct erected by overzealous Western judicial and academic missionaries that serves to antagonize cultural
agnostics by simply replicating the inequalities, distributions, and exclusions already experienced in globalized "free" markets.
B. Taking Identities Seriously? Domesticating!
Externalizing CulturalDifference
Up to now, the discussion of TLPAF, the liberal internationalist position underlying "newness" of transjudicialism in human rights, has
deliberately bracketed the precise character of those theorists' normative
commitments to procedural norms as well as the precise nature of the
relational inquiry necessitated by the turn to proceduralism. The next
two sections of this Part discuss how the externalization of European
liberal domestic politics that cuts across transjudicialism scholarship is
compounded by narrow descriptive and normative accounts of judicial
identity. First, a reliance on a static, essentialized conception of identity
98.
Work linking comparativism to cultural governance projects of "assimilation" and
"exoticization," has barely begun. See David Kennedy, New Approaches to ComparativeLaw:
Comparativismand InternationalGovernance, UTAH L. REV. 545, 614 (1997).
99.
See, e.g., ANGHIE, supra note 69, at 262-63; James Thuo Gathii, Representationsof
Africa in Good Governance Discourse: Policing and Containing Dissidence to NeoLiberalism, 18 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUD. 65, 65-74 (1999).
100.
See RICHARD FALK, ON HUMANE GOVERNANCE: TOWARD A NEW GLOBAL POLITICS
125 (1995).

101.
By "transformative," I adopt the double meaning advanced by Dianne Otto and
Drucilla Cornell, that is,
change radical enough to so dramatically restructure any system-political, legal or
social-that the 'identity' of the system is itself altered. The second meaning, defined as broadly as possible, turns us to the question of what kind of individuals we
would have to become in order to open ourselves to new worlds.
Dianne Otto, Everything Is Dangerous:Some Post-StructuralTools for Rethinking the Universal Knowledge Claims of Human Rights Law, 5 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 17, 24 (1999) (quoting
DRUCILLA CORNELL, TRANSFORMATIONS: RECOLLECTIVE IMAGINATION AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 1(1993)).
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renders judicial interaction and cultural differences among judges incommensurable, even though they are initially made out to be
commensurable and thus conducive to dialogue. Second, relational processes of cultural identity formation and transformation in both horizontal
and vertical axes of communication among courts and local political and
social actors are not perceived as a key explanatory variable that directly
affects the correlation between judicial cross-fertilization and effectiveness.' °2 Instead, compliance with a tribunal's decisions is measured as a
function of tribunal effectiveness and vice-versa. Such a technocratic
correspondence approach between fact and norm makes transjudicialism
theorists indistinguishable from the "nationalist" international law theorists °3 they criticize as revisionist.'04
1. Contours and Critique of the Liberal Procedural Paradigm
The limited instances of "transjudicial communication" claimed to
be universal are amalgamated from a wide spectrum of distinct phenomena-including different types of courts and uses of foreign,
comparative, and international law-and are assimilated under a unified
liberal model of judicial identity. It is assumed that a thin commitment to
law's "proceduralization" can mediate the perennial philosophical and
epistemological tensions and power relations embedded in the purportedly neutral task of conceptualizing "cross-cultural fertilization,"
"genuine dialogue," and agreement between different regional and cultural traditions and value sets in human rights. Distinct normative
concerns appear to be concealed by the discourse of "newness" within
which human rights cross-cultural fertilization narratives are framed.
Within these discursive modes of formation of judicial subjectivities,
these theorists rely on (a) an economistic model of judicial governance
and (b) a technocratic model of the rule of law, "supranationalized"
102.
See generally JOHN G. RUGGIE, CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION 4 (1998) (arguing that constructivism's scientific
basis or explanatory variable is the transformation of identities).
103.
See Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Judicial Independence]. Alejandro Lorite has
offered the "nationalist" designation in his reconstruction of "nationalist international law"
scholarship in these theorists' dialogue with liberal internationalists about what he calls the
"outer realm" of law as a field of scholarly intervention. Both liberal internationalists and
rational choice (nationalist) theorists, in fact, take this concept of the "outer realm" as descriptive and empirical rather than as calling for value judgment. They discuss American foreign
policy and are thus concerned with the relationship of the United States to the outer players of
foreign relations, including the legal frame in which those relations do or should occur. Alejandro Lorite Escorihuela, CulturalRelativism the American Way: The Nationalist School of
International Law in the United States, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Jan. 2005,
http://www.bepress.conlgj/frontiers/vol5/iss l/art2/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
104.
Heifer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at 902, 917-19.
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through human rights policy arguments. These two models are reconstructed ideal-types and constitute the core case for a rationalist
conception of transjudicial communication.
a. The Economistic Governance Model: Courts
as Market Blocks
A court whose ideas or decisions are cited by other courts is, perhaps
surprisingly, not a self-conscious participant in an ongoing conversation.
Its ability to communicate to foreign listeners by and large depends on
the initiative of the listeners themselves and their willingness to be persuaded. This insight suggests that the identities of both "lender/donor"
and "borrower" courts are crucial variables.' 5 Transjudicialism theorists
conceive that horizontally "networked" courts committed to similar values participate in a transjudicial dialogue, which binds them into a loose
"community" in which they establish the respective limits of their authority and influence.' °6 In investigating the underlying attributes that
unify the wide range of discrete examples they build upon, these theorists develop a hedonistic rationalist conception of the judiciary which
leads them to claim that all these instances display commonalities of interests among the judiciaries of liberal democracies-namely a
commitment to judicial autonomy, a reliance on persuasive authority,
and an implicit conception of a common judicial enterprise. 7 Transjudicialism is portrayed in this story as an iterated "tit for tat" rationalist
game made possible only by underlying configurations of common interests between judges. There is, correspondingly, a common
identity forged through such common practices and sense of
professional
108
purpose.
In order to ground the purportedly apolitical nature of practices of
transjudicial argumentation, a formalist dichotomy is further drawn between procedural rules such as judicial independence and the "rule of
law," (which, it is claimed, can be value-neutral, apolitical, universal, and
Habermas sees individuals as beings that not only seek to persuade others but are
105.
themselves open to persuasion. Deliberation permits actors to achieve desired outcomes or
"consensual truth" through "communicative action." A speaker's willingness to change his
own mind in light of what he hears, often in response to what he says, is the precondition for
"true reasoning." See 1 JURGEN HABERMAs, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 286-319 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984).
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 69; William W. Burke106.

White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of InternationalCriminal Law Enforcement,
24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 86 (2003); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003); Sullivan, supra note 77; see also Alston 1993 Report,
supra note 3, T 248.
Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 122.
107.
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 103.
108.
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' This is done
consonant with broad pluralism) and substantive norms."9
in
an attempt to accommodate the paradox of diversity of policy values in
human rights and the universality of liberal principles." The solution
retained accepts in a sense human rights (in their substantive conception)
as parasitic upon political decisionmaking enshrining egalitarian values
and therefore insists on democratic deliberative politics and fair play. On
such a view, judges feel a particular common bond with one another in
adjudicating human rights cases because such disputes engage "a core
judicial function in many countries around the world.""' Departing from
a "presumption of identity,""' 2 they actively engage their foreign brethren
despite cultural and regional differences because they see themselves
engaged in solving the generic legal problems characterizing liberal democracies, namely the balancing of rights and duties, individual and
community interests, and the protection of individual expectations.' '3 The
willingness of a supranational tribunal to engage in judicial deliberation
further suggests prior "recognition of a global set of human rights issues
to be resolved by courts around the world in colloquy with one another,""'4 a recognition flowing from "the ideology of universal human
rights embedded in the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.""'
The liberal legalist conception of a global community of human
rights courts is less about lawmaking as such than about creating a space
insulated from politics. It is concerned with putting in place an environment (process) conducive to designing an optimal set of human rights
standards through developing a political consensus as to the common
good to be pursued by the "community" under the banner of universalism, yet risking either to raise the global human rights baseline too high
or succumb to the "lowest common denominator drag." ' 1 6 A pragmatist
109.
Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 125-29.
110.
Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 389 ("The result does not deny the
importance of local legitimacy and cultural diversity; nor does it assume that law can
genuinely 'float free' of the politics, economics, and cultural traditions of particular peoples.
But it assumes the possibility of universal values and professional ideals and seeks to capture
and reinforce a concept of transjudicial solidarity.").
111.
Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,supra note 68, at 1111; see also Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 134, (depicting protection of human rights as comprising the "core of
judicial identity for many courts").
112.
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 94, 102.
113.
Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 127; see also Helfer & Slaughter, Theory,
supra note 27, at 326.
114.
Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 121-22.
115.
Id. at 122.
116.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, stpra note 27, at 384 (quoting Andrew Byrnes, Towards More Effective Enforcement of Women's Human Rights Through the Use of
InternationalHuman Rights Law and Procedures, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 189, 194 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994)). This point recalls
Dworkin's principle of coherence (or integrity), which implies a shared set of preferences
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approach might lead to a better understanding of what human rights and
legitimate outcomes are really all about. As such, the theory is reminiscent of a Habermasian ontology and understanding of rights as legal
expressions of shared moral convictions evolving from dialogical encounters between peoples in search for common positions and future
agreement on deeply contested issues." 7
This anti-formalist ethos of post-Cold War international human
rights lawyers and transjudicialism theorists undercuts any wariness as to
the kind and style of law, institutions, and rights we would help produce
and promote despite the shift in the disciplinary lexicon towards proceduralism. How are we to assess the moral worth of such standards
without recourse to an external norm whose objectivity and neutrality
are questionable? Why are they to be preferred over other equally
defensible standards derived from the cultural heterogeneity of normgenerating practices? Is there a way out of the paradox of liberalism that
processes that are likely to give rise to subjective, open-ended, heterogeneous, and entirely flexible standards also require upholding and
converging with the human rights jurisprudential acquis? A thin commitment to procedural norms should not be mistaken for objectivity and
value-neutrality, for it can hardly stand as a proxy for an acceptance of and
consensus on common substantive human rights norms and principles.
Rather, participatory procedures serve in the liberal legalist position a circular function which is more ideological and symbolic than real. One
strand in the Marxist critique of bourgeois liberal rights saw liberalism as
based on a particular kind of "false consciousness" in which the exercise
of universally valid civil and political rights (voting, speech, association)
serves to guarantee our universally valid private rights (property and

regarding principles of justice, fairness, and due process (what he calls a "community of principles") from which rules derive in a logical manner. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
225-26, 243 (1986). On this view, to assess the level of "systematization" of a given legal
system one must look at the coherence (as described here) of its body of norms and institutional structures. Hence Slaughter's positivistic intuition that the dialogue occurring between
adjudicative bodies of the world "may be as close as it is possible to come to a formal global
legal system." See Slaughter, Courts, supra note 71, at 218. On "systematization"-the establishment of systemic relationships between legal rules-as a defining aspect of legal
reasoning, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM (1979).
117.
See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER: STUDIES IN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 37-38, 57-58, 82, 191-93 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., 1998); JURGEN
HABERMAS, Remarks on Legitimation Through Human Rights, in THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 117 (Max Pensky ed. & trans., 2001). For a discussion of

deliberation in its more radical agonistic acceptation, which departs from the conventional
Habermasian understanding and where marginalized groups are included and disparities of
power acknowledged, see Dianne Otto, Rethinking the 'Universality' of Human Rights Law,
29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.1, 33 (1997).
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contract),' generating thus a sense of having mediated our split invidualist and collectivist selves, while attainment of other legitimate social
policy goals in "civil society" are rebuffed as necessarily requiring illegitimate distributive choices. Little can be gained by insisting that norms
elaborated through even the most impeccable deliberative process imaginable from a liberal democratic point of view must be accepted as
ethically legitimate: such a conclusion could result only from fetishizing
the process itself. At the same time, there is something deeply disturbing
with the unproblematized claim that we should value judicial crossfertilization on the terms advanced by liberal theory because it is most
likely to produce objectively "better" substantive outcomes in terms of
strengthening the protection of individual human rights in global and
regional contexts."'
A tension emerges from this distorted picture of proceduralism between, on the one hand, the neo-liberal materialism of globalization and
economic governance as the lynchpin of a "trade related, marketfriendly" conception of human rights12° and, on the other hand, an
attempt to maintain an attachment to a non-ideological and non-utopian
" ' Both, however, see human
vocabulary of universal freedom and rights.12
rights as technocratic informal regulatory imports/exports"' in a free
market of ideas where courts of the most powerful and influential
nations (or regional blocks) are the primary stakeholders and production
sites.123 Such a market space in which information and ideas are continu118.
Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY 216 (Loyd David Easton & Kurt H. Guddat eds. & trans., 1967); see
also SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF IDEOLOGY 65 (2000) (arguing that "[tihe democratic norm ...
detaches the need to protect [civil and political] rights from the issue of how economic deprivation and social marginalization affect opportunities for political participation" and that
"[t]he universalizationof civil and political rights thus serves to confer an illusory wholeness
on the divided social body").
119.

Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 326, 377 n.467. This liberal claim,

although existing in different valences, can be attributed to Dworkin's defense of a "dependent" (or outcome-oriented) rather than "detached" conception of democracy. See RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 186 (2000).
120.
See BAXI, supra note 96, at 234.
121.
On the ambiguities of human rights as both a language of suffering and sacrifice
and an economic grammar of global governance, see Anne Orford, Beyond Harmonization:
Trade, Human Rights and the Economy of Sacrifice, 18 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 179 (2005); Anne
Orford, The Subject of Globalization:Economics, Identity and Human Rights, 94 AM. Soc' v
INT'L L. PRoc. 146 (2000).
122.
See SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 19-20, 24, 69, 100 (dis-

cussing information, harmonization, and enforcement regulatory judicial networks).
123.
See also Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational JudicialDialogue in Creating and Enforcing InternationalLaw, 93 GEo. L.J. 487, 499

(2005). Regulatory networks scholarship has been oblivious to the distributive stakes attendant
to the informality of transgovernmental networks and which cannot be captured by a focus on
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ously exchanged is believed to operate devoid of political value, material
distortions, and power asymmetries. The latter, however, are always fluid
on both horizontal and vertical axes of networks in which knowledge
"transmission" occurs.I The social construction of a free market of human rights courts may and often will "favour certain types of ideas
which are better able to package themselves and compete as 'products'
in the manner it [the market] demands."'' 25 The "Hayekian ' ' '26 and "ordoliberal' ' 127 view of human rights, in turn, portrays the reality of
regional and local political and cultural identity struggles as simply norm
consumption sites-as mere aberrations rather than as legitimate alternatives to conceiving the plurality of "market" arrangements. It also shies
away from any discussion of the preconditions for collaborative global
governance to work, "namely, redistribution of resources to counter
power asymmetries among 'stakeholders.! ' ' 2' Regional human rights
systems can both be excluded from the market of ideas or forced into it
through assimilation or convergence without either being logically or
"the pure coordination game." See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, TransnationalRegulatory Networks
and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 115-16 (2009) ("[I]ntemational regulatory cooperation often raises significant conflicts over the distributive consequences of new standards,
as the costs and benefits of alternative proposals fall on different states.... In order to solve
distributive conflicts, international negotiations must involve concessions and tradeoffs across
issue-areas and, in some cases, threats and other manifestations of relative power. These tasks
are not easily entrusted to regulatory agencies, and are at odds with the supposedly apolitical
nature of the [transnational regulatory networks] process.").
124.
See Buxbaum, supra note 74, at 187; Otto, supra note 101, at 41.
125.
Mills & Stephens, supra note 41, at 28.
126.
The expression "Hayekian" was coined by Philip Alston to describe the shifting of
international human rights law "in a way which would fundamentally redefine its contours and
make it subject to the libertarian principles expounded by writers such as Friedrich Hayek,
Richard Pipes, and Randy Barnett" See Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of
Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815, 816 (2002).
127.
The classical reference to Hayek as laying down the premises of ordoliberal economics is found in FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, The Principles of a Liberal Social Order, in
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 174-77 (1967). Alston defines "ordoliberalism" in conventional fashion as insisting on "the importance of an appropriate
constitutional and regulatory framework to provide the setting within which a private law
system premised on private property, contractual freedom, open markets, etc. can flourish."
Alston, supra note 126, at 842 n. 116.
128.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A. Rodrfguez-Garavito, Law, Politics,and the

Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization,in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW:
TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY 7-8 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cdsar A.
Rodrfguez-Garavito eds., 2003) (critiquing Doff and Sabel's theory of "democratic experimentalism" as masking unequal power relationships among network participants). Doff and
Sabel define "democratic experimentalism" as the idea that the diffusion of credible information along networks and the ascertainment of optimal solutions to coordination problems
require deliberation and processes of disaggregated decisionmaking that rely on bottom-up
local problem-solving experiments as a path to convergence around ever better rules. See
Michael Doff & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitutionof DemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUm.
L. REV. 267 (1998).
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necessarily preferable. There are, in the end, no better outcomes when
rights are thrown into the procedural crucible than those that are selfdetermined to be so and justified as such post hoc.2 9
Liberalism's response to such a critical challenge easily turns into a
matter of semantics. Courts partake in "healthy" collective deliberation
above all because of an underlying "modicum of common ground,"
namely a "common methodology," including a common reliance on persuasive authority, as well as a commitment to, and understanding of, the
rule of law. 30 This idea of commitment to interaction among like-minded
rational judicial subjects sharing a transnational space devoid of politics
and distributions of power and governed by law is central to a further
claim by which the descriptive and normative elements are collapsed:
judges of supranational human rights tribunals will interact with each
other in much the same way as judges from domestic constitutional
courts of liberal states engage in dialogue over issues such as appropriate
choice of law rules and human rights standards. The ideas of interdependence and "network" are, however, presented in transjudicialism
scholarship not as the thrust of their normative argument, but rather as an
accurate description of contemporary social reality that furnishes the
background necessary for their normative arguments in the service of the
progressive march towards a global human rights legal community. Their
entire approach and prescriptions for effective supranational human
rights adjudication are therefore built on what they imagine as the transnational virtues of the rule of law and the reality of such interactions.
b. The Technocratic Policy Structure Model: The Supranational
Rule of (Human Rights) Law
Supranational human rights adjudication enthusiasts share with
transjudicialism theorists a staunch belief that the yardstick for evaluating effectiveness is the degree to which supranational courts further the
possibility of enforcing supranational and transnational law. The core
technocratic value that TLPAF is committed to promoting with the asserted "newness" of transjudicialism is the juridical fiction of the
supranational/transnational rule of law. But the claim, often made and
rarely justified, raises more questions: What exactly does the ideal
mean? Do its rationalization and realization necessarily require supranational human rights tribunals to engage in the kind of cross-fertilization
and to discharge the specific role envisaged by liberal legalist theory?
129.
As Baxi poignantly puts it, "[b]oth the inputs and outputs in the portfolio investment in human rights protection and promotion remain indeterminate; nevertheless, these have
to be ledgered, packaged, sold, and purchased, on the most 'productive' terms." BAXI, supra

note 96, at 221.
130.

Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 125-29.
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Realist and Marxist and critical legal scholarship have long been intent to counter the idealized contrast set up by liberal theory between a
"zone of law" and a "zone of politics beyond law,"'' with one reflecting
order and justice, and the other brute power. 1 2 It insists on refashioning
the image that concepts such as "democracy," "rule of law," and "persuasive authority" operate exclusively within the former, are devoid of
asymmetrical power constraints, and can be reduced to singular and determinable historical, social, and cultural constructs. 3 This leftist strand
in internationalist scholarship has important implications for the viability
of the ascendancy of transnationalist policy consciousness in international law. The extent to which a liberal focus on procedure establishes
the foundations for a "transnational community of human rights courts"
remains controversial for theorists who are not committed to mainstream
procedural and institutional renditions of democracy and rule of law and
associated hegemonic explanatory claims. This is particularly so for scientistic or rationalistic accounts pertaining to the inclusiveness of
participation of all concerned, the power of the better argument, and the
principles directing deliberation within established hegemonic social
structures. Factors such as loyalty, autonomous judicial identity, and engagement in a common purpose, allowing for the emergence of a "zone
of overlapping consensus,"'34 also display a very thin instrumentalism
131.
Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the
Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1907, 1917-22 (1992).
132.
For foundational works applying critical and Marxist approaches to international
law through the tool of "ideology critique," see MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO
UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (2005 reissue); CHINA
MIVILLE, BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS (2005); Bhupinder S. Chimni, An Outline of a Marxist
Course on Public InternationalLaw, 17 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 1 (2004); Susan Marks, The End
of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 449, 470
(1997).
133.
Dworkin argues that judges argue and disagree about what the "gravitational force"
of a given norm or judicial decision is because they might be in substantive disagreement
about what the background rules in a legal system provide. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1089-93 (1975). However, he fails to acknowledge that neither this
interpretative support of the community in which the court is embedded nor the "orbit" of a
particular norm or judicial decision is "given" but is socially and culturally constructed to
connect the justification for a particular decision with those that other courts have given in
similar cases.
134.
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1987). Rawls' approach appears to represent a deeply engrained pluralism. However, the
consensus he requires for liberal politics to succeed can only be achieved if subjects refrain
from expressing deeply held religious or philosophical convictions in public argument. This
removes almost all specificity of culture from pluralist theory. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im's
relativist critique supports aspects of Rawls' theory. He argues that "interculturalism" and
diversity are necessary to create universal rights and a more inclusive, polyvocal, grassrootsbased universality. For An'Naim, dialogue between cultures will help achieve an overlapping
consensus on human rights and peaceful co-existence, but each culture must internally accept
the human rights standards to create legitimacy for these standards. See ABDULLAHi AHMED
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and paint a distorted view of identity. Liberalism's emphasis on proceduralism does not explain why human rights judges would be likely to
cite one another (or resist such a practice) from the point of view of cognitive culture (both consonance and dissonance).135
The pervasiveness of the language of identity in transjudicialism
scholarship is, paradoxically, what obfuscates and undermines the conceptual clarity of identity as a conceptual variable in the social sciences as
well as a tool for understanding the distributional effects of transnational
identity politics. Central to a long genealogy in the sociological tradition,
identities describe individual and collective self-understandings about the
traits, characteristics, and worldviews one possesses as a member of a social field or category. Slaughter's conceptualization of liberal judicial
identity, for example, is problematic for two reasons. First, it atomizes and
homogenizes the group by virtue of stereotyped, reified, static, and
non-graduated characteristics.'36 In so doing, it sublimates the individuality
of judges, recasts their role as servants of transnationalnorms while denying the constraints they experience from local and regional sensitivities,'37
and ultimately trivializes the plurality of voices both within and outside
the Western liberal tradition itself. Undue emphasis on the "neutrality" of
AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (1990); HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A

QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed., 1992).
135.
See Basil Markesinis, JudicialMentality: Mental Disposition or Outlook as a Factor Impeding Recourse to Foreign Law, 80 TULANE L. REv. 1325, 1346-50 (2006). Slaughter
recently identified the cognitive dimension of judicial dialogue and how it links to judges'
identity construction. Yet her conception of identity is made a question of psychological and
epistemological understanding by judges, who question who they are in relation to members
of a profession (the "others"), i.e., as a matter of collective rather than individual commitment
and social positioning in a globalized world where supranational, national, and sub-national
identities are mutually constructed. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Brave New JudicialWorld, in
AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 277, 297 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005)
[hereinafter Slaughter, A Brave New Judicial World].
136.
See Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 136 ("Transjudicial communication ...

presupposes that the courts involved conceive of themselves as autonomous governmental
actors even beyond national borders; that they speak a sufficient common language to interact
in terms of persuasion rather than compulsion; and that they understand themselves as similar
entities engaged in a common enterprise .... The reinforcement of courts as autonomous
international and transnational actors is a step toward the disaggregation of state sovereignty

...
.).
137.
See Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 101, 115-16 (2008) (sounding the
cautionary note that "[t]o the extent that the [IACtHR] is pursuing the institutional goal of
coordinating states' global and regional obligations, prematurely hardening global soft law at
the regional level does not necessarily serve that goal .... Soft law formulations often assert
categorical claims that would require qualifications and exceptions to take into account countervailing interests, including other rights and resource constraints."); see also Verdier, supra
note 123, at 50 (arguing that "regulators acting within TRNs can-and should-develop a
dual loyalty to domestic interests and to "the rights and interests of all peoples").
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such norms raises important agency questions for the role constraints of
adjudicators, who are at once managers of "objective," context-specific
human rights regimes and "subjectified" members of a transjudicial
community.'3 This dual stance of the transnationalist subject of politics
often requires him to balance and mediate his roles in enhancing regime
effectiveness against legitimacy concerns and competing identities, perceptions, and interests at home. Yet such balancing is inimical to a robust
transnationalist policy consciousness, which denies that such "role constraints" take place.
The second difficulty with such a romanticized view of identity is
that it too quickly assumes that judicial behavior generally follows an
instrumental rationality, a patterned economic calculus of costs and
reciprocal benefits based on preferences and identities that are fixed, that
is, somehow exogenous to and ontologically prior to the international
system. 3 9 On this background, by engaging in repeated interactions with
other tribunals and in creating greater predictability in substantive
outcomes, judges actually believe that judicial dialogue (and normative
convergence) can be easier, quicker, and, most importantly, cost-effective
for international cooperation beyond pareto-optimal levels. 1 Dialogue
40

138.

See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE FIELD OF

CULTURAL PRODUCTION:

ON ART AND LITERATURE (Randal Johnson ed., 1993) (emphasizing a system

ESSAYS

of dispositions,

or habitus-lasting, acquired schemes of perception, thought, and action in his analysis of the
structure of social fields-an analysis that responds to the divide created by structuralists'
emphasis on the subjective (internal) perceptions of actors and Kantians' grounding of the
influence and determinism of social forces on human interactions on transcendental (external)
claims of objectivism); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF SOCIETY 3-16, 281-85
(1984) (explaining agency as part of his theory of structuration in which "capacity" means
autonomous centers of deliberation and action). For Bourdieu in particular, the individual
agent develops a system of dispositions in response to the objective conditions he encounters.
PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 54 (1990). Bourdieu thus theorizes the inculcation of objective social structures into the subjective, mental experience of agents. Having
thereby absorbed objective social structure into a personal set of cognitive and somatic dispositions, and the subjective structures of action of the agent then being commensurate with the
objective structures and extant exigencies of the social field, a doxic relationship emerges. See
id.
139.
On the methodological basis of such a rationalist approach, see ROBERT 0.
KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECON-

5-31 (1984) (explaining that such an approach "takes the existence of mutual interests as
given and examines the conditions under which they will lead to cooperation," where cooperation is analyzed "less as an effort to implement high ideals than as a means of attaining
self-interested economic and political goals"); id. at 6, 24-25.
140.
Raustiala argues that "the existence of a network strengthens incentives for jurisdictions to seek convergence because convergence allows for deeper and broader cooperation."
See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental
Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 68 (2002); see also
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 169. Pareto optimality is an important
concept of economics with implications for game theory and translates generally into a measure of economic efficiency and distribution of income or goods. For game theorists, given a
oMy
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can significantly reduce the "transaction costs" of independent regulation and administration of the relevant human rights regimes. The most
cost-effective way to enforce substantive human rights would be to put
in place processes that will alleviate the task of devising distinctive regulatory, administrative, and enforcement strategies through information
exchange and networking opportunities.14 The apparent facticity of such
a claim rests, however, on a theory that remains state-centric, domestic,
and domesticated by fetishizing and calcifying preferences within states.
It is assumed that states simply act as agents of a particular topography
of individual and group preferences and interests determined domestically.14 1 "Government officials and institutions participating in
transnational government networks represent the interests of their respective nations, but as distinctjudicial ...interests.'', 43 The theory thus
embraces a rationalist conception of agency that reduces all political
(and judicial) action to strategic interaction.'" At this point the collapse
of a state's liberal identity with judicial identities becomes crucially relevant in the argument. Following something analogous to a vulgar
historical deterministic orthodox Marxist claim of "determination in the
last instance"' 45 by the base of the supranational human rights legal su46
perstructure-a claim that judges represent the "executive committee"'
of ruling societal interests-individuals and societal groups define their
interests at home independently of and beyond politics, and judges define judicial preferences instrumentally and act purposively as the

set of alternative allocations of income or goods, an outcome of a game is Pareto-optimal if
there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well off and at least one player

strictly better off. That is, a Pareto-optimal outcome cannot be improved upon without hurting
at least one player. Crucially, Pareto optimality does not necessarily result in a socially desirable distribution of resources, as it makes no statement about equality or the overall wellbeing of a society. See YEw-KWANG NG, WELFARE ECONOMICS: TOWARDS A MORE
COMPLETE ANALYSIS (2004).
141.
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 19-20, 24, 171-72, 177-78,
213,249-50.
142.
For a critique of this understanding by rational choice theorists, see Kratochwil,
supra note 29, at 61-62.
143.
Slaughter, Networks, supra note 91, at 200 (emphasis added).
144.
For a critique of a legal theory based on a positivistic liberal understanding of international relations as undermining the capacity to reason normatively about international
change, see generally Reus-Smit, supra note 92.
145.
For a famous critique of this idea that nevertheless supplements Marx's thought, see
Louis Althusser, Contradiction and Overdetermination in FOR MARXI 111 (Louis Althusser
ed., Ben Brewster trans., 1969).
146.
Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in I KARL MARX &
FREDERICK ENGELS, SELECTED WORKS 36 (1969).
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mouthpieces for these local interests47through judicial exchange and collective deliberation supranationally.
Such a view is difficult to sustain historically, as it downplays the
traditional liberal emphasis on the role of a thick "sense of community
and justice" and the emergence of norms and institutions through the
growing perception of common interests in relation to specific sets of
substantive human rights issues and values. In so doing, however, it also
eschews a thin commitment to rights as relational norms that structure
and sustain significant relationships of mutual constitution of meaning
between social actors, without any a priori commitment to any particular
kind of substantive relationships and values fostered through these interactions.'4 8 Harold Koh has thus effectively mounted a scathing critique of
the thinness of liberal theory's descriptivism, arguing that "identity theories"'49 do not fully account for the normativity of one's participationin
"transnational legal process."'5 ° But what he misses is that identity does
have a bearing precisely on how that process will take shape relationally,
the underlying conditions that make it work, the kind of relationships
that are fostered through these transnational interactions, and who will
ultimately join and benefit from it. He only partly answers the question
he is concerned with ("Why Do Nations Obey International Law?"), and
does not ask why certain transnational legal process actors internalize
certain norms as part of their internal value set and not other norms. He
is also not self-critical about which assumptions about the culture of the
dominant group underlie such a "top-down" process of norm internalization. 5'
147.
This claim is based on Moravcsik's liberal theory of international politics and its
thin account of state preferences derived from ascendant individual and group preferences. See
Moravcsik, supra note 36, at 517.
148.
Relational theory, mostly in its feminist incarnation, distinguishes the liberal conception of "rights" from "rights relations," where emphasis shifts from questions of pedigree,
hierarchy, boundaries, and rights-talk to structuring "relationships-of power, of responsibility,
of trust, of obligation." Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationship, I REV.
CONST. STUD. 1, 13 (1993). Thus, "this reality of relationship in rights becomes the central
focus of the concept itself, and thus of all discussion of what should be treated as rights, how
they should be enforced, and how they should be interpreted." Id. at 14.
149.
Slaughter would resist her classification amongst constructivists, whose central
tenet is identity formation. Her agenda is closer to the neo-liberal rationalist paradigm though
her work can be enlisted in support of different constructivist conclusions.
150.
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599, 2646 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey?]. Koh explains this complex
process as one of transnational interaction whereby global norms are not just debated and
interpreted, but ultimately "internalized" by domestic legal systems as an aspect of identity
transformation. See Koh, supra, at 2646-51; Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEaB. L. REv. 181, 202-03 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, TransnationalLegal Process].
151.
See Umut Ozsu, Towards a Critical Constructivist Theory of Legal "NormInternalization": Two Cases from Early Republican Turkey, at 30 (2007) (unpublished L.L.M.
Thesis, Univ. of Toronto) (on file with author). I am grateful to Umut Ozsu for discussions on
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Identities in judicial dialogue are significant in that they provide the
basis for interests and preferences,'52 a point that has often been neglected in both legal and political science studies. Interests, in turn,
53
develop "in the process of defining situations" and social relations.'
Identities and their discursive modes of production and distribution, on
one hand, and norms, on the other, are mutually constitutive and
relationaland inform explanations of both continuity and change in social relationships fostered in the deliberative process, regularized
patterns of practices and behaviors, and moments of discontinuity in (judicial) dialogue. 5 4 The human rights judge is a social actor belonging to
a multitude of social groups with which he shares an "identity affiliation" that can be challenged or reinforced through interactions and with
which he might exchange meaning or share a geographical, experiential,
or other characteristic through collective deliberation and argumentation
without necessarily gesturing at convergence of worldviews.'55 Notions
like "human rights" differ in the extent to which and the manner in
which the self is identified cognitively with the other. It is upon this cognitive variation and mapping onto the socio-cultural environment that the
meaning of norms and the distribution of political rationalities and
power among the different human rights cultures (global and local)
largely depends. This opens up a horizon of possibilities by which the
many particularisms of judges and legal regimes may be articulated but
which are impossible to realize all at once.
From this perspective, it appears the "network" concept in transjudicialism scholarship is not really doing much analytic work at all beyond
rhetorical and historicist "interpellation."' 56 It tends to make us forget the
this point. Brunn~e and Toope refer to this as "the features that give legal norms a distinctive
ability to gain internalization and to shape actor identities." Jutta Brunnfe & Stephen J. Toope,
Persuasion and Enforcement: Explaining Compliance with InternationalLaw, 2002 FINNISH
YB. INT'L L. 273, 291. Yet this emphasis on the internalfeatures (based on some notion of
morality) of norms seems to downplay the relevance of the formative role of identity and culture as constitutive of norms and social interactions. I discuss this more fully below.
152.
Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics,46 INT'L ORG. 391, 397-98 (1992) [hereinafter Wendt, Anarchy].

153.
ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY
(1999) [hereinafter WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY].
154.
155.

OF INTERNATIONAL

POLITICS

224, 231

Wendt, Anarchy, supra note 152, at 397-99.
Thomas Risse, Let's Argue!: Communicative Action in World Politics, 54 INT'L
ORG. 1, 10, 22, 28-33 (2000); Wendt, Anarchy, supra note 152, at 398, 401.
156.
"Interpellation" has been used by Louis Althusser to describe the process by which
ideology addresses the (abstract) pre-ideological individual, producing him or her as subject
proper. The situation always precedes the (individual or collective) subject, who, precisely as
an ideological subject, is "always-already" interpellated. Louis ALTHUSSER, Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127, 170-76
(Ben Brewster trans., 1971). In the context of the social sciences, to be interpellated is to identify with a particular idea or identity which already constitutes us, such as a sense of
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spectrality of identity affiliations of an individual judge and their "intersectionality"-that is, the holistic impact of the multiplicity of these
affiliations on his perception of each of these.'57 Only a truly intersectional analysis allows for the broadest possible examination of the
totality of relationships of power and knowledge formation on grounds
of gender, race, class, etc. implicated in transjudicial dialogue in human
rights. The "network" concept also provides an incomplete ethnographic
map of why network members interact and to what extent informal network structures influence their behavior. 5 1 Political questions about how
judges as subjects come to be constituted in the first place are blithely
ignored. The next section of this Article argues that the competing identity-based narrative highlighted by an exploration of the discursive or
communicative constitution of identity and social connections-through
relational structures of language and rhetorical practices harnessed to
local culture-endanger this assumption and hence the very possibility
of the theory. Liberalism seeks to foster diversity and difference in individual or group identities but only under the allure of a robust and static
Western liberal construction of the self.5 9 Yet as Martti Koskenniemi reminded us, without specific contextual articulation, "we know virtually
nothing of 'understandings' or 'beliefs': the insides of social agents remain irreducibly opaque." '60 In refusing to engage with the implosion of
the judicial self in its encounter with local culture, TLPAF's liberalism
appears, in the end, strikingly illiberal.
belonging to a "networked" human rights world as an international lawyer's real condition of
existence.
157.
A focus on "intersectionality" and distribution in tackling a wide range of socioeconomic consequences of legal rules and regimes and adjudication owes a great deal to the
work of relational feminists and critical race theorists. See generally RELATIONAL AUTONOMY:
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona
Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000); Kimberle Crenshaw, A Black Feminist Critique of
AntidiscriminationLaw and Politics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 195
(David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,
Identity Politics,and Violence Against Women of Color,43 STAN L. REV. 1241 (1991).
158.
See generally ANNELISE RILES, THE NETWORK INSIDE OUT (2001). In describing
and theorizing an aspect of transnational existence through which institutional knowledge
practices are produced and reified and which she calls "analytical forms," Riles enacts a new
ethnographic method for apprehending networks such as the U.N. Fourth World Conference
on Women in 1995, from the perspective of those inside the network (bureaucrats and activists) who, rather than being mere observers of the artifacts of transnational life, are producers,
consumers, and "aesthetes" of these artifacts.
159.
Franck sees "imagined" communities as borderless, and he transposes the concept
to predict a growing liberal hegemony through recognition of the increasing power of individualism. The self can be constructed at the expense of interaction and socialization of agents
and structures. His arguments suggest that individuals come to society pre-formed, having

"chosen" or "defined" their identities.

THOMAS

160.

KOSKENNIEMI,

M.

FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND

40-60, 100 (1999).
FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA, supra note 132, at 597.

SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM
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Such a legal process orientation entails a rationalist, empirical viewpoint that prevents any study of identity as a causal variable explaining a
wide variety of modes of transjudicial communication and resistance
taking place among judges of supranational human rights tribunals. This
has important implications for projects of reform because of the ways in
which internationalists argue about the strengthening/renewal of international human rights law to overcome institutional inertia and compliance
gaps and achieve effectiveness. These deficiencies in transjudicialism
scholarship are glaringly symptomatic of many conceptual and methodological shortcomings, as well as of coordination problems of a
generation of social identity scholarship.16 ' The omission, however, cuts
much deeper in the field of international human rights, for, as will be
further discussed below, human rights do not yield so readily to the calculus of a pre-determined configuration of interests that rational choice
and transjudicialism
theorists appear to have taken renewed delight in
62
uncovering.
This methodological problem resulting from contradictions in the
combination of the two models exposed above is perhaps best exemplified by the claim that a global community of courts will engage in
dialogue systematically because of some common features shared by
judges. It is not denied that the nature of the interactions within the
transnational legal community will often be "conflictual," in the sense
used by Mouffe in her critique of the Schmittian democracy postulate of
destructive conflicts among equal antagonistic actors (friend-enemy, usthem).6 6 But out of such conflict will necessarily emerge greater dialogue and ultimately a doctrine of convergence, under which judges will
listen to their foreign counterparts unless their judicial systems do not
"measure up to minimum standards of international justice."'' 6 Yet a
transnational legal community or a global community of law is precisely
161.

Thus,

[t]he main conceptual questions that the field has yet to answer satisfactorily are:
how can we compare different types of identities; and how can we exploit theoretical advances in operationalizing identity as a variable? Among "coordination"
problems we include the lack of consistency and clarity in defining and measuring
identities, the lack of coordination of identity research at both the cross-disciplinary
and cross-sub-field levels, and missed opportunities to take advantage of expanded
methodological options.
Rawi Abdelal et al., Identity as a Variable, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 695, 696 (2006).
162.
See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 20; Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note
27.
163.
See Chantal Mouffe, Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy, in THE
CHALLENGE OF CARL SCHMITT 38, 42-44 (Chantal Mouffe ed., 1999); see also CARL
SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL

164.

27 (George D. Schwab trans., 1996).

Slaughter, Courts, supra note 71, at 194.
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what is purported to emerge out of these interactions. By asserting that
transjudicial communication is both a step towards (cause) and an effect
of a transnational community of law,'6 the one is substituted for the
other and used as the measure for the other. This collapses the independent and dependent variables, rendering measurement of judicial human
rights cross-fertilization and effectiveness, and empirical verification of
any causal relationship between the two variables virtually impossible.
This, in turn, masks the contradictions within proceduralism itself, and
serves to legitimize the liberal project of transjudicialism and undermine
alternative explanations of this complex phenomenon that are based on
relational cultural identity construction.
2. Contradictions Within the Paradigm: Judicial Communication
and the Dilemmas of Culture
A robust commitment to procedural norms appears to deny that
compliance (as a measure of effectiveness) may be enhanced through
factors other than communication itself: the normative force of human
rights law, the discursive power of ideas and norm-making processes and
institutions,167 and the relationally constitutive influence of cognitive culture and local cultural forces on sustaining social relationships and
producing identities. The reasons for rejecting the relevance of existing
normative (ideational, constructivist) approaches to compliance that take
identity seriously are nowhere explained in transjudicialism scholarship.
Yet it seems that an approach that takes human rights normativity seriously also cannot avoid exploring the interplay and tensions between
these methodologies. Indeed, this may be crucially relevant for any attempt, such as the one made in this Article, at radically reconfiguring the
liberal account of effective supranational human rights adjudication
while framing cautions for constructivist accounts of identity construction, which fail to problematize the role played by culture.
a. The Paradox of Communication Exposed:
Loving and Loathing Identity
Human rights courts and judges are treated in transjudicialism scholarship as fungible "like units,' bound together by a "prior convergence
of deep-seated principles and values, as well as modes of legal reasoning
165.
See SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 78 (opining that where
judges "are persuaded [by their foreign colleagues] to the point of actual convergence of decisions on certain issues, judicial cross-fertilization begins to evolve into something deeper,
resembling an emerging global jurisprudence").
166.
Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supranote 27, at 298.
167.
A similar point is made by Kratochwil, supra note 29, at 57, 59.
168.
Slaughter, LiberalStates, supra note 33, at 524.
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about those principles and values."'' 69 This anthropomorphic conceptualization of judicial identity assumes it to be a culturally bounded category
and, more importantly, needs it to be so if "identity" is not to immediately endanger the liberal internationalist project. The unity of identity
"black-box"' 7 fiction, a realist assumption about the ontological foundations of classic public international law that liberals once fiercely
attacked but which, paradoxically, they now desperately need for their
approach, is introduced through multiple regional and culturally rooted
exclusions. These concern the genesis and type of actors that judges are
and, most fundamentally, the kind of political project advanced by
transjudicialism theorists. 7' The resistance of European judges to judicial cross-fertilization with their non-European human rights judicial
counterparts provides ample material with which to demonstrate that
these exclusions and disciplining of culture and the normative, on the
one hand, and transjudicialism theorists' bracketing of domestic politics,
on the other, are not innocent methodological choices but a political
move which threatens the very plausibility of their argument. It is, in
other words, precisely the possibility of such an approach that is compromised by its perilous liaison with identity and culture.
At the cost of foregoing analytical rigor, transjudicialism theorists
eschew the extensive and growing body of constructivist literature that
explores how actor identities are socially constructed products of social
learning, knowledge, and ideology through iterations of interaction.'
Constructivists describe a world in which shared understandings or behavioral expectations can effectively be generated across cultures
through processes of institutionalization and social learning, and that this
matters in carving out social reality. At one level, this is a point of simili169.
Slaughter, Typology, supra note 44, at 133. Wendt distinguishes "corporate" from
"social" (or "role") identities of states: the former, which can readily be associated with
Slaughter's liberal conception of judicial identity, are composed of "intrinsic, self-organizing
qualities that constitute actor individuality," while the latter are social constructs through interaction, that is, "sets of meanings that an actor attributes to itself while taking the
perspective of others." Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International
State, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 384, 385 (1994) [hereinafter Wendt, Collective].
170.
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A DualAgenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205,207 (1993).
171.
See SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 187; Helfer & Slaughter,
Theory, supra note 27, at 373.
172.
Constructivism is not only a political theory distinct from liberalism, but also, and
more appropriately, a distinct ontology based on the beliefs that the "structures of human
association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces" and that "the
identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than
given by nature." WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 153, at 1. For structurationists like
Giddens and Wendt, then, neither agents (actors within a given setting) nor social structures
are logically pre-existent or determining; each is constituted through interaction with the
other. For Giddens' theory of structuration, see generally GIDDENS, supra note 138.
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tude with various strands of post-colonial and post-structuralist critique
of the "aggressive" version of the universalist idiom of human rights'73
on which liberal theory rests. By contrast, transjudicialism theorists imagine an "interactionist convention"'' 74 in which they undertake two
intricately related yet contradictory moves. First, they assume two judicial actors (or judges) who come to interact only after we have imagined
them on their own, that is, prior to and independent from social and cultural context. 7 5 Second, they argue that compliance with human rights
norms and institutions depends largely on whether or not a state can be
characterized as having an identifiable and pre-existing "liberal" identity. 76 This two-fold strategy of at once detaching judicial interactions
from, and embedding them within, culture downplays the role cultural
identities play in shaping political action and behavior at the level of
domestic structure beyond the pale of instrumentalism, Marxist determinism, functionalism, and the statist paradigm. 77 These identities are
neither liberal nor preexisting. Rather, they are constructed through
complex interactions at multiple levels of governance between judges,
domestic regulators, and transnational and local social movements.
In a "disaggregated" judicial world, 7 1 judges are powerful actors capable of deploying the discourse of human rights ideologically both to
insulate themselves and the profession from political interference and to
hide their political agendas, particularly those not predominant in the life
of their institution or refractory to the social community in which they
are embedded. 7 9 This is by and large tributary of a certain role-splitting
in the ways in which the judicial function has traditionally been
173.
174.

See Otto, supra note 101, at 21.
This expression is derived from WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 153, at 328,

who uses it to describe the social interaction, or relational experience, of two actors, ego and
alter,through which social learning occurs, id. at 329-35.
175.

Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison, 7 EUR. J. INT'L

REL. 315 (2001) (critiquing Wendt's alter-ego scheme as actually assuming that social actors
precede their social context of interaction).
This is an empirically unproven hypothesis by transjudicialism theorists' own ad176.
mission. See Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 331.
Koh argues that to the extent Slaughter's theory engages with identity, it "becomes
177.
uncomfortably reminiscent of the 'cultural relativism' debate in international human rights
law." Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, supra note 150, at 203.

The cornerstone of Slaughter's theory is the idea that one should look beyond the
178.
veil of sovereignty to the component parts of liberal states, sub-state actors, and citizens interacting with each other-that is, to the "disaggregated" state. I use this neologism against
Slaughter to underscore that it is less courts as identical units operating within a "free market
of ideas" than judges with distinct interests and identities that are relationally produced
through relationships sustained through patterns of interaction with various social and political
actors at different levels of governance.
179.
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Judicial Governance and the Ideology of Human Rights:
Reflections from a Social Movement Perspective, in HUMAN RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL EMPOWERMENT 200, 203, 212-17 (C. Raj Kumar & K. Chockalingam eds., 2007).
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conceived. Courts (and judges) now increasingly take on functions of
local and supranational "governmentality. ' '8 It is therefore misleading to
depict judges as merely engaged in a series of bilateral relations with the
discrete individuals and states coming before them when adjudicating
human rights. "Judicial governance" actually plays a crucial role in the
reflexive construction of judges' own identity structures and in how they
identify with other judges. It also structures relationships through the
work of defining rights and obligations of addressees of judicial decisions in the process of shaping an expanding human rights normative
order. 8' The liberal understanding of judicial identity cannot, however,
cope with the complexity and over-determination of identities which are
unstable in themselves for it is mainly concerned with policing the
boundaries rather than probing the content of localized constructions
about the self.'82 Their overriding concern is that, in the "final instance,"
judges can always reinforce their pre-existing "common" judicial identity through interaction and harmonization (what they share as a matter
of dominant, objective, community-wide rather than subjective, individual, particularized commitment). Without this common identity, judges
would likely see themselves as effectively caught up in a prisoner's dilemma: reluctant to enter into a dialogue with other judges or willing to
defect from an ongoing conversation, despite an ethical endorsement of
the idea of "dialogue," without the availability of reliable information
about the likelihood of repeated iterations or others' defections, or assurances about reciprocation or defection, or about the fact that, as a result
of such interaction, they will all be "better off." A deeper account of how
cross-cultural knowledge and norm-production occur in supranational
human rights adjudication would focus instead on such judicial interactions as both a function of broader interactional processes of identity and
knowledge-building (of both "imagined" epistemic communities and
"real-world" legal orders), and a function of power deployment and resource distribution.

180.
"Govemmentality" as a purely instrumental attitude to the activity of "governing,"
in which rules have at best a tactical role and are legitimated through the exercise of individual
freedom (self-governance), famously derives from the later Foucault. See MICHEL FOUCAULT,
THE CARE OF THE SELF: VOLUME 3 OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans.,
1986); Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN GOVERNMENTALITY 87 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991).
181.
As Wendt explains, "[s]uch structures are often codified in formal rules and norms,
but these have motivational force only in virtue of actors' socialization to and participation in
collective knowledge. Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart
from actors' ideas about how the world works." Wendt, Anarchy, supra note 152, at 399.
182.
See Slaughter, A Brave New Judicial World, supra note 135, at 292.
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b. On the Blurred Methodological Matrix: Towards an "Interactional"
Approach to Human Rights Cross-Cultural Fertilization
To trace the relative potency of TLPAF, one must therefore look beyond transjudicialism theorists' thin commitments to procedural norms
to examine the relationships fostered through a focus on deliberation.
The most likely candidate seems to be the laudable feat expended by IL
and IR scholars over the last twenty years to demonstrate that "interactional" processes of law- and decisionmaking are necessary to ensure
compliance with international regimes."' The late Abram Chayes, and
Antonia Handler Chayes, for example, developed a "managerial" theory
of compliance that emphasizes capacity-building, diplomatic "jawboning," and sustained participation, engagement, and interaction with other
actors in international regulatory regimes, accomplished through mostly
verbal interchange and persuasion.M The theory assumes that "a successful compliance management process is explicitly cooperative and
interactive,""' features also characteristic of transjudicial communication. On the other hand, Koh's theory of norm internalization, briefly
evoked above, emphasizes law's normativity: how legal rules generated
by interactions
among. transnational
legal actors shape and guide future
trannatinal
86
transnational interactions. It is not the place here to sketch these theories in any greater detail. Suffice it to say that both approaches recognize
that international legal norms help construct national identities and interests through a process of justificatory discourse and persuasion. But by
focusing less on particular substantive issue areas than on the transubstantive continuities of process, Koh's theory carries the additional
benefit of emphasizing that transnational law is both dynamic-mutating
from public to private, domestic to international, and back again-and
constitutive, in the sense of operating to shape and reconstitute national
identities through interaction, interpretation, and norm-internalization in
domestic legal structures. 187 As Brunn6e and Toope have pointed out,
183.
On an "interactional" conception of international law which draws upon Lon Fuller's interactional theory of law by linking it to the insights of constructivist IRliterature, and
which has deeply influenced this Article, see Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J. Toope, International
Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of InternationalLaw, 39 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 19 (2000).
184.
ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22-28, 118-23 (1995); see also
Kratochwil, supra note 29, at 60-61 (explaining the relevance of interactional accounts of the
effect of norms on state behavior).
185.
Raustiala, supra note 140, at 79.
186.
Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 FrankelLecture: Bringing InternationalLaw Home,

35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 642, 675 (1998).
187.

See Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, supra note 150, at 204; Koh, Why Do Na-

tions Obey?, supra note 150, at 2627, 2631, 2654.
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Koh's central contribution to identity-building is "to break the path of
'obedience' down into a series of interactional processes."'88
Both of these theories, those of other theorists of "persuasion" such
as Heifer and Slaughter, but also of constructivist scholars of "acculturation" such as Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks (as we shall see below), 9
remain deficient to the extent they operate within specific paradigms of
western modernity and rationality that predetermine, within a highly
homogenized, global, cultural policy and normative environment, the
actors for whom international human rights law exists. First, states are
the primary units whose identities are being constructed through interaction with supranational institutions. Second, there is a shift away from
the relevance of judicial dialogue to global/local identity-formation, to
traditional and new forms of dispute resolution (inter-state and transnational public law litigation), executive action, administrative
decisionmaking and enforcement, and legislation as part of an emerging
transnational legal process in which statecraft still remains a primary
attribute. Such statist historiography remains blind to how the transnational link between horizontal communication among supranational
human rights institutions and vertical channels between the domestic,
grassroots, and supranational levels operates in human rights praxis. It is
this very intersection that will determine how and the extent to which the
"managerial process" of judicial dialogue at the supranational level will
actually construct, and not merely reflect, power relations, and the identities of all participants and stakeholders and the cultural legitimacy of
norm diffusion patterns, as well as how and the extent to which it will, in
turn, be shaped by these encounters.
An approach premised on the significance of actor identities (broadly construed) in shaping and being constructed by transjudicial
communication, rather than on the subject-matter of disputes, or the disputes themselves, has much to contribute to human rights scholarship in
the ongoing architectural discussions of a "post-national constellation."' 9
188.
See Brunnde & Toope, supra note 151, at 291.
189.
See infra note 279 and accompanying text.
190.
Constructivist formulations have been strongly influenced by the philosophy of
language and communication. Some constructivists have found support in Jurgen Habermas's
writings for the proposition that identities of international actors are constructed in large part
through "communicative action." Processes of deliberation require of actors, namely states,
that they learn to be "discursively competent," that is, capable of persuading. See FRIEDRICH V.
KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS AND DECISIONS 124, 230 (1989); Nicholas Onuf, Do Rules Say
What They Do? From Ordinary Language to International Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 385,
397-402 (1985); Risse, supra note 155, at 5. By replacing the paradigm of knowledge of objects beyond the subject with the paradigm of understanding among subjects capable of
speaking and acting, however, the focus is on the performative attitude of discursively competent participants in interaction. This shift of focus and perspective will raise tolerance for
conflict only insofar as judges understand each other as contenders in a common judicial en-
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As Brunnre and Toope explain in articulating their "interactional theory
of international law," "[iun focusing upon the construction of actor identity, constructivists complement Fuller, helping to explain the impact of
interaction, and why it may lead to cooperation and the emergence of
norms." 91 In turn, "[r]ules and norms constitute the international game
by determining who the actors are, [and] what rules they must follow if
they wish to ensure that particular consequences follow from specific
acts ....
Constructivists are concerned to show that identities may be
sustained or may change through interaction and that this also matters to
compliance or deepening forms of enforcement.'9 The claim that shifting
judicial and local identities influence human rights norms through repeated interaction and reinterpretation of rules, and ultimately the nature
of the legal regime that states are invited to internalize, signifies that this
regime, although ingrained at any given time, is not an unchanging fact.
It may, however, not always be easily transformed. This is particularly
the case when judges have an important distributive stake in maintaining
stable identities (due to internal constraints they experience such as a
commitment to a common European history, sensibility, hegemony, or
cultural tradition). 194
Such a reconfigured approach to judicial dialogue, which accounts
for an integrated model of law's dialectical influence on state and local
cultural identities, offers two main advantages to which existing sociological accounts are not sufficiently sensitive. First, it avoids the pitfalls
of a purist or ethically "ideal" conception of communication by recognizing all contributors on equal footing and both the formative and
terprise with deep respect for each other's competence. To the extent the latter is modeled
largely on theories of citizen participation and tailoring to local circumstances that tend to
assume the existence of more or less democratic polities in which these processes can take
place, and thus is associated with certain features common to liberal democracies, such as a
common understanding of and commitment to the rule of law, it remains confined to a rationalist analysis that would almost expect courts, as a pre-condition to dialogue, to be
"strategically competent" that is, capable of identifying common interests and pursuing them
rationally through judicial interaction and suasion. Liberal theory's commitment to methodological individualism thus idealizes how the conversation will be performed, excluding not
only the range of participants in the process (or demos), but also the importance of identity
formation measured by social communications.
191.
Brunnre & Toope, supra note 183, at 67 (building upon Lon Fuller's work on the
interactional nature of law and the role of principles and values in adjudication against the
widely-held positivistic ethos of a rule-based conception of law). Fuller's thesis is developed
in his classical work. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
192.

Ngaire Woods, The Uses of Theory in the Study of InternationalRelations, in Ex-

PLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE

1945, at 26 (Ngaire Woods ed., 1996).

193.
Brunne & Toope, supra note 151, at 285.
194.
See also Wendt, Anarchy, supra note 152, at 328, 339. Thus, following Bourdieu,
once structures of identity have been created, they are not easy to transform because the European human rights regime becomes, in a sense, an objective social fact to judges and a law
unto itself.
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transformative effects of repeated participation of judges in deliberation
and adjudication through the use of language. Second, it also acknowledges the "bottom-up," constitutive role of norms (legal but also sociocultural), power, material resources, values, relationships, and identities at
horizontal and vertical levels in that process.'9 This reconfiguration would
serve as an important corrective to the prevailing understanding of scholars and practitioners, most of whom are Western, who debilitatingly
address the glaring absence of effective enforcement of human rights
norms and decisions in the Third World without offering a comprehensive picture linking it to the cultural and social processes and resistance
struggles by which these norms come to be articulated in the language of
human rights both at the domestic and supranational levels in the first
place.
In developing the methodology of such an approach, I draw first on
the psychology of linguistics, and particularly Socio-Discursive Interactionism (SDI), a movement in the socio-cognitive sciences that branched
from Social Interactionism as a result of various authors' studies, for example those of Vygotski and Mead, that went beyond the Piagetian
image of linear cognitive development of the child through speech.196
SDI defends the idea that the processes of social and cultural structuring
of human relations and the processes of self-structuring are two inseparable sides of the same issue: the human development process.' 97 The
specificity of the SDI project comes from the central role given to language not only in the construction of texts and works but also of
conscious thought of individuals and their identities.'98 SDI is based on
the principle that human behavior is the result of organizing reality
semiotically by the appropriation and internalization of socially and historically produced semiotic instruments through the development of

195.

For a rare foray into processes of judicial identity building in transjudicial commu-

nication which acknowledges the dearth of theoretical and empirical analyses on the
dialectical production of legal norms and culture in the existing literature on networks and
transnational legal process, see Waters, supra note 123, at 502-03 (relying on "co-constitutive
theory" to describe the "mutually reinforcing relations between international legal norms and
domestic cultural and societal norms" and emphasizing iterative processes of "norm export"
and "norm convergence," but where the emphasis, just like in transnational legal process scholarship, is placed on a narrow range of actors, namely "'law-declaring fora'-domestic courts,
legislatures, foreign ministries, and the like").
196.
For the principal works upon which proponents of SDI rely in constructing their
model, see LEV SEMENOVICH VYGOTSKI, THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE (1962); GEORGE H.
MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST (1934).
197.
See JEAN-PAUL BRONCKART, ACTIVIT9 LANGAGItRE, TEXTES ET DISCOURS: POUR
UN INTERACTIONISME SOCIO-DISCURSIF 19 (1997). This work is considered by scholars in the
psychology of linguistics as the leading text on SDI by one of its founders.
198.
Id. at 20.
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conscious thought and the capacity to act.' 99 Research in this area aims to
demonstrate, on the one hand, the crucial role of language in the development of conscious thought and, on the other, the role that language
assumes at later stages of peoples' development, in the epistemic and
praxeological areas of that same development .200 On this background, the
place of human psychology in the reshaping of the human/social sciences is at the same time nodal-in that all these sciences are concerned
with topics of a representative nature, that is, the elaboration of a discursive universe, and secondary to them in so far as psychological
functioning is socially and culturally produced. 20 ' Thus, all discursive
production, including a human rights norm, text, or judicial decision, is
negotiated in specific situations and deployed in an interactional space in
which discourse-producing and receiving agents verbally interact. 22 The
broad methodology of the approach briefly sketched here is related to an
inquiry into what can be called textual understanding and textual production as "action" (action langagikre)23 as the basic unit of analysis of

human behavior, while discourse is the linguistic unit corresponding to
action.'0 This kind of action has a social dimension in that it is inscribed
in a form of interaction between discourse-producing and receiving
agents which predetermines the goals that may be jointly pursued and
which endows these agents with a specific social function in relation to
the world.205 Rights discourse is "shaped by social action in the sense that
it is interpreted and described in relation to specific contexts and speech
genres." 2°6 What is postulated here is that a judge is always confronted
with multiple and multifaceted interpretations of human actions and human rights texts and norms which he comprehends as lived textual
"realities," which over time become grounded in his habitus and in
which he must make20 7 distributive choices within his mental map and
rights consciousness.
A second strand in this reconstructive project draws on relational
theory. Feminist relational theorists find value in the rhetorical force of
rights discourse, but consider discussions of the normative source of
199.
200.

Id. at 59-60.
See LAURENT

FILLIETTAZ

&

EDDY ROULET,

The Geneva Model of Discourse

Analysis: An Interactionistand Modular Approach to Discourse Organization, 4
STUD. 369, 380--83 (2002).
201.
BRONCKART, supra note 197, at 22-3 1.
202.
Id. at 33-34, 46.
203.
Id. at 39, 42-43, 101-02.
204.
Id. at 13-14, 139-40.

205.
206.
207.
2002).

DIsCOURSE

Id. at 96-97.
FILLIETTAZ & ROULET, supra note 200, at 373.
See generally MINDING THE LAW (Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner eds.,
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rights and questions of hierarchy and fit unhelpful.0 8 They analyze rights
instead as relational and recast them as tools revisable in the service of
desirable or optimal relationships in particular settings.2 9 Their key insight is that in defining and enforcing rights, judicial decisionmaking
structures relationships, although it seldom is self-conscious about it.20
The core value they are committed to is relational autonomy, which they
define as the capacity "to find and live in accordance with one's own
law.""1 ' Consistent with the values to which feminist relational theorists
remain committed and their attentiveness to context, relational autonomy
"requires attention to the 'impact of social and political structures, especially sexism and other forms of oppression, on the lives and
opportunities of individuals.' ,,2
Robert Leckey distinguishes relational theory's descriptive premise
or contextual methodology from its substantive conceptions or normative
commitments, and a relational inquiry's weak and strong conceptions, in
a way that is useful for understanding the thin constructivist insights
generated by transjudicialism theorists' commitment to proceduralism.
The descriptive premise merely refers to the idea that selves are relationally constituted through social interactions; it directs judges and jurists,
in turn, to focus on relationships in interpreting and understanding
claims arising out of relationships of mutual interdependence. The weak
version of this relational approach to law production and adjudication is
content-neutral and "attempts to identify the constellation of relevant
relationships around a given individual or the parties to a dispute,"2 '3
while leaving open the question of what kind of relationships we want to
foster. The strong conception is normative and remains committed to
promoting optimal relationships, "ones that foster or promote relational
autonomy. ' 214 A contextual methodology, for its part, means looking at
structures of power, gender, race, or class relationships that extent beyond the particular circumstances of a dispute. Contrary to relational

208.
Nedelsky, supra note 148, at 3.
209.
Id. at 8, 12.
210.
Id. at 14.
211.
See, e.g., Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 10 (1989); see also Introduction to RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF, supra
note 157, at 4, 21-22. Elsewhere Nedelsky characterizes autonomy as "self-governance,;
which "requires the capacity to participate in collective as well as individual governance." See
Nedelsky, supra note 148, at 8.
212.
ROBERT LECKEY, CONTEXTUAL SUBJECTS: FAMILY, STATE, AND RELATIONAL THEORY 10 (2008).
213.
Id. at 13.
214.
Id. at 14.
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theorists' normative commitments, it is not associated with particular
normative views of optimal relationships. 15
Administrative law is a site that relational theorists have investigated
and that presents crucial insights for supranational human rights adjudication, for both focus on the problem of how to reconcile
interdependence, individual autonomy, and collective power in decisionmaking-which takes form in the relationships between individuals
or groups and bureaucratic institutions. Reviewing extensively the work
of relational theorists such as Jennifer Nedelsky and Joel Handler, Leckey criticizes these theorists' administrative law scholarship for their
attempts to pass off their ideas of the "good life" (or the promotion of
relational autonomy through fostering "thick," "interdependent," and
"intimate relationships" between citizens and the administrative state) as
necessarily entailed by the relational inquiry they call for, when such a
setting is unsuitable to fostering such relationships in the service of relational autonomy."6 He also faults relational theorists' work on
administrative law for obstructing broader structural elements of bureaucratic processes and by suppressing different interests by focusing on the
optimal citizen-bureaucrat relationship." 7 Such processes of social interactions are characterized by "strategic imperatives, domination, and
violence" and dependence rather than interdependence, at least to the
extent that the liberal conception of rights is one which falls within the
view of rights-protection as the allocation of or securing of benefits to
vulnerable individuals against the state." 8
It is, of course, only from a normative standpoint that one can criticize human rights decisions or norms and their effectiveness, and
undertake the kind of evaluative work necessary for a critical political
project such as the one pursued in this Article. This would require tracing out the implications of one's normative commitments to a particular
kind of good relationship. Those working within the weak, neutral conception of the relational inquiry place, however, "too high a premium"
on what they present as accurate descriptions of "embedded selves" and
their autonomy vis-a-vis bureaucratic institutions," 9 whether at the level
of the individual, the group, the state, or a supranational court. This
215.
Id. at 18-19.
216.
Id. at 21.
217.
Id. at 26-27,227-36.
218.
Id. at 223 (arguing that "relational theory can slip into an unattractive imperialism
in claiming that all, or at least too many, relations should be thickly relational-indeed intimate-in relational theory's normative sense"); see also id. at 235 ("The conception of rights
bearer instates an entitlement to treatment with dignity and fairness, qualities that are better
understood as palliating a relation of dependence rather than characterizing one of interdependence.").
219.
Id. at 226, 229-30.
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focus on enhancing existing relationships has the effect of precluding a
radical reconstruction or transformation of a relationship marked by a
particular distribution of power and resources by altering the material
conditions that render the individual or group vulnerable vis-a-vis the
state, non-state entities, and supranational institutions.2 0 But, in looking
at transjudicialism scholarship, there is little sense, even in this weak
form of the relational inquiry that relational theorists latch onto, of any
awareness of relationships to be sustained and enhanced through the interactions between supranational human rights judges, states, social
movements, and those who appear to be beneficiaries of their decisions-that is, relationships through which identities are produced. What
is demanded here goes well beyond a requirement that the decisionmaker apply a human rights norm through a contextual method, namely
by customizing the norm or decision to the individual claimant in his or
her context or merely particularizing the universal to tailor it to local
values.22 ' Such awareness would insist, instead, on the idea that human
rights judges' contextualism has discursive and material effects in producing identities and reproducing hierarchies of power and structures of
oppression through the promotion of particular configurations of relationships (some pertaining, for example, to structural market conditions,
racism, and patriarchy). 2 It would assist in generating among various
actors different experiences of subjectivity beyond the conventional liberal understandings of an alienated sense of a human rights judge,
human rights violating state, rights-holder, or victim of a human rights
abuse.
Consistent with, complementing, and yet outside of Koh223 and
Brunn6e and Toope's work is such an approach that I call "judicial sociodiscursive interactionism," which suggests that heightened interaction
among judicial regulators, domestic political administrators, local
groups, and elites can reinforce or dilute human rights norms through
"rhetorical persuasion" within practices of argument and contestation.
Rights, in turn, can structure and sustain patterns of relationships that
foster particular values that are not reducible to those liberalism associates with "human rights" but that are, instead, more sensitive to
distributive issues. Such relations affect the outlook and actions of Third
220.
221.

Id. at 239, 241-43.
For an interesting collection of essays probing this dimension of human rights ac-

tivist praxis, see

THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL

(Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007).
See Nedelsky, supra note 148, at 16-18.

AND THE LOCAL

222.

223.
See Harold Hongju Koh, How Is InternationalHuman Rights Law Enforced?, 74
IND. L.J. 1397, 1399, 1409-10 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Partof Our
Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43,44 n.5 (2004).
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World regulators and social movements at the domestic level and these,
in turn, influence levels of state compliance with human rights commitments. Transjudicialism theorists, on the other hand, set artificial limits
on the transformational potential of discursive rights strategies deployed
by supranational courts' judges, states, and Third World social movements both at the supranational and domestic levels through their
interaction by ossifying state and judicial identities224 and rooting out
local popular identities, contestations, and resistance altogether.
The account sketched here also finds strong affinities with some important ethnographic work being done in the field of transnational
advocacy. For Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, domestic regimetype is only a starting point for understanding why and how actors (such
as courts) form networks or for explaining their differing impact on governmental policy. 225 They suggest that liberal theory's prescriptions
acknowledge that preferences within states take shape through identityformation and transformation, but that these theorists remain agnostic
22 6
about how identities of actors through their interactions are configured.
Yet equally important, their case studies conclude that the effectiveness
and viability of such networks turn on the characteristics of the subject
matter sought to be regulated, the types of actors sought to be affected (including their vulnerability to both material and moral leverage, ideology,
224.
Kratochwil, supra note 29, at 65-67 (taking a skeptical view of the possibility of
unique causal explanation in norms research).
225.
MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 202 (1998). Similarly, Heifer et al. question, by
reference to the Andean legal context, the liberal thesis that liberal democracy is "an all-ornothing category," for "fragile democracies may have areas where the rule of law functions
effectively, while robust democracies can have weak spots." See Laurence R. Heifer et al.,
Islands of Effective InternationalAdjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of
Law in the Andean Community, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 43 n. 223 (2009). They argue that the
Andean Tribunal of Justice has helped to build an island of effective international adjudication-but only in the area of intellectual property-in a region where democratic regimes are
not fully entrenched, the rule of law is fragile and often ignored, and domestic courts are not
fully independent "because domestic IP agencies act as compliance constituencies for its rulings." Id. at 5-6, 43.
226.
KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 225, at 214. Moravcsik explicitly recognizes this
point. See Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal InternationalRelations Theory: A Scientific Assessment, in PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: APPRAISING THE FIELD 159, 162
n.4 (Colin Elman & Miriam Fendius Elman eds., 2003) ("Cultural or sociological arguments
that privilege collective social beliefs, either domestic or transnational, as sources of such
social preferences, are not excluded."); see also Anne-Mane Slaughter, InternationalLaw and

International Relations Theory: A Prospectus, in

THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

39 (Eyal Benvenisti & Mosche

Hirsch eds., 2004) (arguing that liberalism incorporates constructivist causal mechanisms but
that "[1]iberals take no distinctive position on the origins of social identities ... nor on the
question of whether they ultimately reflect ideational or material factors," and that such constructivism in liberal theory is thus unsurprisingly thin) (citing Moravcsik, supra, at 168-69
n. 14).
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and symbolic violence), and, in addition, the types of regimes involved. 27 Keck and Sikkink's shift in focus to sites of social contestation
and mobilization of human rights discourse in their account of the operation of transnational networks may provide a much more plausible and
normatively deeper explanation for the scope and nature of judicial
communication and the relationships that are promoted in the process
among supranational human rights courts and local culture than liberal
theory does. As Jos6 Alvarez explains:
The transnational impact of human rights decisions ... is not
necessarily evidenced by whether [a] case is cited by other
courts or even consciously accepted by domestic judges as persuasive precedent. Its greatest impact may not be felt within
other liberal courts .... [I]t may have the greatest resonance precisely in those fragile democracies subject to the "boomerang
pattern of influence" that [Keck and Sikkink] describe as characterizing much transnational network activity .... 228
The impact of the persuasiveness of a court's effort to engage in sustained dialogue with other courts as well as local and transnational
advocacy groups, and its awareness of contextual sensitivity to relations
structured by power, cultural contestations, and economic distributions,
are dependent upon politics both within and outside states, rather than
merely on peer pressure or judicial socialization. Non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental expert networks, mass Third World social
movements, advocacy groups, and a variety of other norm-promoting
actors such as the atomized rights-bearer, the media, scholars, and judges
are actively
in
what ideational scholars call a "spiral model" of
huma
rigtsengaged
"
229
human rights change. In this model, these actors link up with "principled issue-networks '230 and create shared understandings, thus promoting
learning within states about how and when to receive or internalize a

227.

KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 225, at 29-30.
228.
Alvarez, supra note 39, at 232 (citing Keck & Sikkink, supra note 225). According
to Risse and Sikkink, "a 'boomerang' pattern of influence exists when domestic groups in a
repressive state bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to bring
pressure on their states from outside." Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of
Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE, supra note 22, at 1, 18; Keck &
Sikkink, supra note 190, at 12-13.
229.
Risse & Sikkink, supra note 228, at 17-35.
230.
Sikkink describes such networks as linked by shared values or principled ideasbeliefs about what is right or wrong in the "real world." See Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights,
Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411, 411-12

(1993).
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given human rights norm or decision produced through such interactions.3

Transjudicial communication among supranational human rights
' of
courts invites important work in generating a "middle-range theory"232
persuasion and social influence supplemented by empirical data that
transjudicialism theorists fail to deliver. 33 Specifying what this might
entail, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. I conclude this part
by suggesting a set of questions that might usefully orient the elaboration of such a prospectus for judicial socio-discursive interactionism and
for future socio-legal research attentive to the kind of relationships
fostered through encounters between judges, states, the individual rightbearer, and local and transnational social movements. These questions
should make it clear that those studying compliance issues in relation to
human rights can no longer remain myopic to the relevance of identity as
a causal variable in what governments, judges, and other social actors do
and how they perceive their relationships to one another.
The key question could be broadly framed as entailing an examination of how concretely identities of different actors are constituted and
transformed through language at multiple levels of governance within
and beyond the nation-state through judicial cross-fertilization among
supranational human rights courts. More specifically, how do human
rights norms emerging from these interactions both persuade and exert
socialpressure on domestic actors to alter their behavior? Do differences
among types of norms (for example, "soft law" agreements versus binding human rights instruments), social structures, and patterns of behavior
231.
For a critique of the pragmatist approach of network theorists to defining and enforcing labor rights based on a Habermasian discursive understanding of rights (while
recognizing the theoretical merits of an "interactional" approach to norm creation), see Philip
Alston & James Heenan, Shrinking the International Labor Code: An Unintended Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declarationon Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work?, 36
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221, 249-53 (2004).
232.
The expression is Jeffrey Checkel's, who argued that constructivists (or normdriven theorists) lack such a convincing theory connecting agents and norms, one which
would explain more precisely the operation of (legal) norms in influencing the identity and
behavior of agents. See Jeffrey T. Checkel, The ConstructivistTurn in InternationalRelations
Theory, 50 WORLD POL. 324, 325-26 (1998). For a related discussion, see Andrew T. Guzman,
A Compliance-BasedTheory of InternationalLaw, 19 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1832 (2002) (arguing that "observing that a norm generates compliance does not offer an explanation for
compliance since we have no theory of why norms operate as a force for compliance"). A
similar charge can be leveled against Koh's account of norm-internalization, which is primarily descriptive. Habermas' speech-act theory is one such theoretical project which some
international relations scholars use to bridge the gap left by constructivism, although one
should keep in mind its abovementioned underlying ideological premises and its operationalizing difficulties.
233.
Slaughter argues that the ultimate value of her "thought experiment" "must await
empirical confirmation of specific hypotheses distilled from [her] model." Slaughter, Liberal
States, supra note 33, at 505.
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matter and, if so, how? What are the particular processes by which "rhetorical knowledge" 2 4 is created and shared among human rights tribunals
and judges, and appropriated by local constituencies to further their own
agendas? And on what (or whose) cultural terms should such discursive
processes be analyzed? What values do various social actors interacting
with each other through the deployment of rights discourse want to promote, and what kinds of relationships structured by rights discourse are
conducive to enhancing those values? If states obey human rights law as
a result of repeated interaction between these tribunals and local culture,
to what extent does a judicial decision itself help constitute the cultural
identity of a state and other actors over time through the relationships
fostered through their encounter, not merely as a law-abiding or compliant social actor in the "here and now"? One might further ask what role
lawyers, scholars, activists, and social movements play before courts and
in the background to litigation and advocacy strategies in processes of
transjudicial communication in advancing their "clients"' interests and
ensuring that defendant governments' policies ultimately conform to
human rights norms and decisions issued by supranational institutions.
Substantial parts of the architecture of human rights law-namely
supranational adjudicatory institutions-have historically evolved in a
rather ambivalent relationship with transnational activist groups as well
as with the concept of identity, and this has impacted the way disciplinary narratives of critique and renewal in international human rights
have been written since the early 1990s. But this does not require elevating constructivist accounts (or a particular version of constructivism) of
judicial cross-fertilization and dialogue over and above other equally
plausible socio-scientific approaches. If anything is to be redeemed from
a deconstructive exercise such as the one undertaken in this Article, it
must lie in a careful blending of elements derived from sociological,
normative, philosophical, instrumental, and liberal inquiries. Yet this is
precisely what transjudicialism theorists refrain from doing by establish' That
ing the analytical priority of liberal theory's "causal paradigm."235
transjudicialism scholarship has no concrete conceptualization of identity-production and contestation that engages the actual levels of state
sociability and interactions of social movements with supranational hu-

234.
Brunne & Toope, supra note 183, at 71. This rhetorical function of knowledge
production through interaction brings Brunnde and Toope's position fairly close to the tenets
of Socio-Discursive Interactionism.
235.
See Moravcsik, supra note 36, at 540; Slaughter, Liberal Theory, supra note 91, at
243.
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man rights institutions (identity as effect)23 6 and, further, no theory of the
causal effect of identity on the formation of human rights norms and institutions (identity as cause) remains to this day a serious shortcoming.
"Identity" is rendered in essentialist ways by its association with TLPAF
as a variable that can be inserted into already existing normative commitments and a package of views about world ordering and disciplinary
renewal.
Part I of this Article argues that this parochialism of transjudicialism scholarship has profound distributive implications for the enduring
viability of those theorists' normative proposals for enhancing the effectiveness of human rights regimes.
II.

RE-CODING IDENTITY IN CONSTRUCTIVIST GEOGRAPHY:

MEASURING HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME EFFECTIVENESS

Imported laws or "legal transplants" are usually claimed to function
less well than internally developed laws because of the foreignness of
uprooted elements of a legal system to the cultural realm and social
structures in which they become embedded. 237 For law and economic
theorists, it is presumed that the expected "efficiency" of the law and
legal institutions is the predominant factor in determining which laws are
transplanted, from where, and to where.2 " But explanations of "legal effectiveness" differ. Most studies of regime effectiveness employ a
behavioral definition, looking not to actual changes in patterns of conformity of state conduct with rules, norms, and decisions but239
rather to
behavioral vicissitudes
that are
linked to the
r
. . In
I exbehvioal icssiude
tht
re causally
ausllylikedto
heregime
pounding their "convergence" thesis for enhancing the effectiveness of
non-European human rights tribunals such as the HRC, transjudicialism
theorists, however, have analyzed the comparative effectiveness of ECJ

236.
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1749, 1753 (2003); Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note
22, at 642-43, 648, 700.
237.
See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993).
238.
For a useful exposition of this scholarship and critique from the left, see generally
Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants:An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics,
14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1994).
239.
See generally THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998);
Oran R. Young & Marc A. Levy, The Effectiveness of InternationalEnvironmental Regimes, in
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS

AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999).
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and ECtHR judgments as measured by compliance rates. 24° Compliance
has caused legal scholars ample difficulties in formulating clearly what
the concept would mean,24' marking a professional turn to quantitative
measurement by way of benchmarks and "indicators" disguised in the
technical languages of science, objectivity, and neutrality. 242 But liberal
theorists have acknowledged that collapsing the two related but distinct
concepts of compliance and effectiveness rather than examining their
interaction also creates "difficulties. 243 In proceeding to make visible the
entanglement of these two concepts with human rights cross-cultural
fertilization and norm-internalization, this Part foregrounds how their
distributional politics affect their path-dependency in liberal theory.
A. "Effectiveness" and the DistributivePolitics of Expertise
Effectiveness is a concept with manifold denominations that are part
of legal and political rhetoric and are based on contingent perceptions of
the importance of certain objectives to be achieved in the world and the
costs of their achievements. 2" The previous Part of this Article illustrated
how this concept is embedded in TLPAF-that is, a liberal cosmopolitan
sensibility shared by transjudicialism theorists and post Cold-War human
rights lawyers of governance as/by expert rule, 24' which contributes to a
structural vision hinging on uniformity and homogeneity in international
human rights law despite claims to cultural sensitivity. The modem
claims to newness, uniformity, coherence, and consistency are still legitimized today by the use of binary and colonial language (of
effectiveness and ineffectiveness) to describe non-European differences
and to mediate the relationships between the European and nonEuropean human rights universes in specific ways. It is the concept's
significance in practice, however, which renders arguments based on
effectiveness and on related aspects such as compliance, implementation,
and enforcement 246 an essential and frequently used agent in legal and
240.
See also Posner & Yoo, Judicial Independence, supra note 103, at 27-29 (adopting
this measurement tool in addition to two others: "usage rates" and the "overall success of the
treaty regime that established the court").
241.
Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of InternationalLaw, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1998).
242.
AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring
Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 253, 289 (2009).
243.
Heifer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at 917.
244.
See e.g., id. at 917-18; Michael A. Mehling, Between Scylla and Charybdis: The
Concept of Effectiveness in InternationalEnvironmental Law, in 2002 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L.
129, 132, 138-74, 181.
245.
David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: InternationalGovernanceand
the Politics of Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 463 (2001).
246.
I refer to these related concepts more broadly as a measure of the validity of law
and, by extension, its resultant binding force, from the perspective of descriptive and analytic
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political discourse. Such arguments are used alternatively and indeterminately, either to promote a measure or to argue against its expedience
and legitimacy as part of a program of disciplinary renewal.14' The notion
has, like the much-romanticized idea of "unity,'2 48 a very powerful and
universal appeal: surely, all individuals and societies should seek effectiveness! The appeal of the idea is, however, no panacea for what
remains an "essentially contested concept,1 41 which is largely a function
of competing conceptions of the political morality of international human rights law.
A specific "expert" view on the effectiveness of concerted action to
protect human rights through law and institutions might well serve to
epitomize unsettling doubts regarding the foundational and universal
claims guiding moral and scientific forms of thought. For this reason, the
concept cannot, as the United Nations has attempted,5 be reduced to a
question of how fixed distributive concerns about future efforts to promote normative growth in the field of human rights will be alleviated.
Traditional examples of such a rigid technocratic approach2 1' have included a wide range of formal and anti-formal techniques of reform, from
greater accessibility to information, streamlining of working methods of
252
human rights bodies, face-to-face meetings, professional socialization,
more equitable allocation of material resources, and technical assistance to
other judges, to more radical renewalist proposals of "constitutionalizing"

jurisprudence. See HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100 (1962); RAZ, supra note
116, at 203.
247.
See Karl Doehring, Effectiveness, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 43 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1995).
248.
MARIO PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2011).
249.
I borrow the term "essentially contested concept" from W.B. Gallie. See Walter

Bryce Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCI-

167, 169 (1956). Gallie used this idea in relation to abstract, qualitative notions such as
art, religion, science, democracy, and social justice to describe "concepts the proper use of
which inevitably involves endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users,"
and these disputes cannot be settled by appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the
canons of logic alone. Id.
250.
See Alston 1993 Report, supra note 3,
252-54.
251.
Id. in 19, 108. For a similar list of reform techniques, see also Andrew Byrnes, An
Effective Complaints Procedure in the Context of International Human Rights Law, in THE
ETY

UN

HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

139 (Anne F Bayefsky ed., 2001); 2005

World Summit Outcome, supra note 6, 1 125.
252.
For examples of the latter, see Raustiala, supra note 140, at 89-90. According to
Slaughter, these are the very "same forces pushing towards convergence ... [but] can also
result in informed divergence." See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked Order,40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 283, 301 (2004).
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253

human rights in the law of worldwide organizations. Such an approach
might impede consideration of other epistemological aspects essential to
the understanding of effectiveness, such as contrapuntal cultural identity
formation and transformation, aspects whose neglect would render a partial and overly simplified picture of the concept, often with little or no
verifiable impact on the real world of violations."4
If we agree that "the question is never about realising rights that are
"out there," but always about whom we are to privilege and how scarce
resources are to be allocated, then it becomes imperative to articulate the
criteria of distribution that underlie such choices ' 25 5 in any disciplinary
program of renewal. Effectiveness cannot merely be perceived in fixed
distributive terms-that is, with human beings in Third World societies
abstracted as "people in need of protection" and rights as luxury goods
to be purchased or diffused through the natural play of judges and stakeholders within a predetermined rationalistic transjudicial frame. This
would neglect important background norms and distributional arrangements for effectiveness in the definitions of persons in need, the Third
World, human rights violating countries, and other popular images propagated by international and supranational human rights institutions.
Identity is a contested ground where individuals constantly make shifting
choices in "the shadow of the law,25 6 with important distributional consequences. Such a mistaken view also assumes an already high level of
cultural homogenization. For Alston as well as Helfer and Slaughter,
writing at the onset of calls for institutional effectiveness in the field of
international human rights in the early 1990s, these criteria of distribution are clearly one-sided and boil down to judging the effectiveness of
the overall scheme on the basis of the coherence and consistency of its
relevant parts. But the crude formalism of such a whole/part frame of
analysis conceals the fact that consistency can hardly be a matter of preestablished definitions without begging the very question of the basis on
which the value of the whole regime and its real-world impact is itself
253.
See, e.g., Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights, Constitutionalismand the World
Trade Organization: Challengesfor World Trade OrganizationJurisprudenceand Civil Society, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 633 (2006).
254.
See Dianne Otto, Rethinking Universals: Opening Transformative Possibilities in
International Human Rights Law, 1997 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L. L. 1 (discussing transformative
discursive accounts of human rights law grounded in identity-building); Darren C. Zook, Decolonizing Law: Identity Politics, Human Rights, and the United Nations, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS.

J. 95, 97 (2006).
255.
Martti Koskenniemi, Human Rights, Politics,and Love, 2002 FINNISH Y.B.

INT'L L.
79, 90; see also Kennedy, supra note 245.
256.
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (using the phrase "shadow of the law" to refer
to the impact that the legal system exerts on bargaining and negotiation outside of traditional
legal forums).
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supposed to be assessed and thus resorting to an external criterion whose
legitimacy is placed beyond politics.257 Coherence goes hand in hand
with our deep-seated moral convictions and our most pragmatic assessments of how things work and ought to work in the real world. The
debate on the relationship between normative action and effectiveness in
the discipline of international human rights law is critical because it is a
proxy for a larger debate taking place within and outside the United Nations. As transjudicialism theorists argue themselves, without engaging
with these issues,
[t]he effectiveness of a particular court or of courts in general
quickly becomes intertwined with larger jurisprudential questions such as the nature of law and the sources of compliance.
Defining effectiveness also inevitably requires asking the question "effective for what purpose?"-an inquiry that will in turn
depend on a prior conception of the functions of specific courts
within specific legal systems.2 8
Compliance is typically an important aspect of the invention and
production by transjudicialism theorists of images of regime effectiveness, but is by no means the only one, particularly if one thinks of
effectiveness in non-institutional terms. Slaughter explains elsewhere
with Kal Raustiala that effectiveness can be defined in varying ways.2 9
The "wide" approach suggests the concept is best understood as the
"problem solving," "goal achievement," or "policy suitability" capacity
of a rule (or remedy) (that is, as the degree to which a rule improves the
state of the underlying problem, or achieves the rule's or regime's policy
objectives and therefore holds the aspirations of its subjects in check).2 °
The need to specify such "goals" and "problems" is occasionally

257.

See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 70, at 397. Koskenniemi argues:

If the institutions are invoked in order to defend (or criticize) tradition, then the tradition cannot, without circularity, be invoked to defend (or criticize) institutions.
The result will be a purely institutional-pragmatic, technical discourse in which an
autonomous super-criterion of "effectiveness" or "binding force" will determine the
acceptability of particular outcomes. Normative politics becomes institutional technique.
Id.
258.

Heifer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 282; see also Kratochwil, supra note

29, at 57 (discussing the effectiveness of international institutions as a function of the conceptions and expectations of their members).
259.
Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw, InternationalRelations
and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 539 (Walter Carlsnaes et
al. eds., 2002).
260.
See Kratochwil, supra note 29, at 53; Young & Levy, supra note 239, at 4-6.
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avoided by supplanting them with an exogenous variable,26' such as the
achievement of tangible environmental improvements.262 Other authors
have been reluctant to contend with the manifold complexities involved
in observing such impacts in the physical world writ large and have
opted for the "narrow" view of effectiveness. This focuses on the degree
to which a rule induces observable political effects 263 or desired changes
in behavior, 4 with the latter often qualified circularly by its ability to
261
further the rule's goals or the broader goals of a treaty regime.
Rules or regimes can be effective in any of these senses even if compliance is low. For example, if a legal standard is quite exacting, even
widespread failure to meet it may still correlate with observable, desired
change in behavior that otherwise would not have occurred.2 6 Thus, low
levels of compliance are not inherently an indication of ineffectiveness.
And while high levels of compliance can indicate high levels of effectiveness, they can also indicate low, readily met, and ineffective
standards. This is so because many international agreements (although
arguably not all human rights treaties) reflect a lowest common denominator dynamic that makes compliance easy and almost automatic, but
has a negligible influence on behavior.267 Compliance (or lack thereof)
with a commitment that states have asked a supranational tribunal to police, or with a tribunal's decision regarding a norm states are asked to
internalize thus tells us little about the nature of the commitment or decision. 268 It also doesn't say much about its utility and psychological and
sociological impact on behavior through the deployment of rights discourse. According to Raustiala, "the critical factor is the relationship
between the stringency of the legal standard and the baseline of behav-

261.
Thomas Bernauer, The Effect of InternationalEnvironmental Institutions: How We
Might Learn More, 49 INT'L ORG. 351, 369 (1995).
262.
Robert 0. Keohane, Analyzing the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Institutions, in INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AID: PITFALLS AND PROMISE 3, 14 (Robert
0. Keohane & M.A. Levy eds., 1996).
263.
Peter M. Haas et al., The Effectiveness of InternationalEnvironmental Institutions,
in INSTITUTIONS FOR THE EARTH: SOURCES OF EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 3, 7 (Peter M. Haas et al. eds., 1993).
264.
Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 387, 394 (2000); see also Kingsbury, supra note 241, at 361
(criticizing the "purposive approach" to effectiveness).
265.
Young & Levy, supra note 239, at 1.
266.
Raustiala, supra note 264, at 394, 396.
267.
Id. at 392. Many international environmental agreements, for example, have this
characteristic.
268.
Id.; see also Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice
Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 187, 189 (2008); id. at 188 (nonetheless defining effectiveness as "the tribunal's ability to enhance compliance with the associated substantive
obligation").
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'
ior."269
Because compliance levels are largely "an artifact of the legal rule
or standard chosen,' 27 ° "ascertaining why compliance or noncompliance
occurs is more challenging ' 271 than merely evaluating whether it has, in
fact, occurred.

B. Human Rights, Cross-Fertilization,and Effectiveness:
Constituting Path-Dependency

In attempting to conceptualize "effectiveness" in the context of judicial cross-fertilization between supranational human rights tribunals, the
conceptual limitations of the various denotations of the concept evoked
earlier are readily apparent. One is often faced with significant difficulties when trying to determine the defined goal, purpose, or problem
framed by a human rights judicial norm. The alternate approach would
involve a flat substitution of these with some form of extraneous standard such as whether it redresses human rights abuses or safeguards the
common goal of human dignity.27 2 But this also arouses concern as to its
ultimate legitimacy.
An analytical focus in transjudicialism scholarship and rational
choice theory on compliance as an objective fact to be recorded is misplaced and sociologically counterproductive when considering
disciplinary reform strategies. Fundamentally, it exhibits an alarming
degree of indifference toward questions of distribution and social and
cultural legitimacy and the substance (and perceived exigencies) of law,
which will often call for a creative act of interpretation. Benedict Kingsbury notes that recent studies of environmental and human rights norms
show "checkered patterns of conformity and non-conformity with rules,
and highlight the differences between conduct prescribed by rules and
the actual conduct and long-term policies necessary to meet the underlying objectives of the particular international regime and other important
policy goals., 27 3 "These and other studies conclusively show that the as-

sumption that conformity and non-conformity are binary is not an
adequate reflection of international practice, in which degrees of conformity or non-conformity and the circumstances of particular behavior
269.
Raustiala, supra note 264, at 394 ("When the legal standard mimics or falls below
the baseline-whether intentionally or coincidentally-compliance is high but effectiveness
low."); see also Kingsbury, supra note 241, at 355.
270.
Raustiala, supra note 264, at 391.
271.
Id.
272.
See, e.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 367-448 (1980).
273.
Kingsbury, supra note 241, at 347-48. Andrew Hurrell, moreover, describes "differing patterns of compliance between different types of states." Andrew Hurrell, International
Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 49, 71 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993).
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often seem more important to the participants. 21 4 If we are serious in
seeking to understand how and why judges of human rights courts engage in dialogue and when such discursive exercises and the resulting
norms and decisions are effective, we must analyze the political objectives of compliance and the underlying sources of state behavior. These
sources include the substantive legitimacy of the norm or decision (such
as its relationship to notions of fairness275 or morality ); the perceived
legitimacy of the process of judicial interaction leading to its creation;
domestic political and popular pressure; reputational costs;... or simply a
state's perceived immediate best interest. A much more fruitful analytic
focus would be the causal impact of human rights norms and decisions
on behavior and the linkages between these sophisticated causal pathways, compliance, and the role of cultural identities and relationships
produced in the process. An account of a court's ability to compel and
cajole compliance with its judgments following such judicial interactions
that does not engage other social and normative factors is largely insuffi-

cient. 218
Human rights commitments and judicial decisions interpreting and
applying them are "onerous" for states and will usually impose substantial constraints on domestic political structure and social forms. The
resulting decisions would therefore not be fully complied with.279 If we
agree that such a tribunal is not necessarily ineffective as a result, there
is no reason to contend that the tribunal's participation in judicial interactions was not effective merely as a result of low rates of compliance
with its resulting judgments. Similarly, a tribunal's insulation from the
jurisprudential output of its brethren is not necessarily a bad thing and
will not always result in its judgments yielding lower compliance rates

274.
Kingsbury, supra note 241, at 348.
275.
See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 40
(1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 183-94 (1990).
276.
See Brunn6e & Toope, supra note 151, at 274-75, 292.
277.
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 25-70 (2008). See generally Guzman, supra note 232 (discussing the role of reputation in promoting state compliance).
278.
See Kingsbury, supra note 241, at 356 (arguing that "an approach to compliance
that focuses only on objectively observable patterns of behavior implicitly takes these patterns
as proxies for internal attitudes and other relevant normative effects [and] there frequently a
risk that policy based on the circumscribed view of norms employed in rationalist instrumental
theories will be sub-optimal or dysfunctional").
279.
See Helfer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at 919; see also Goodman &
Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, supra note 22, at 173-78 (dealing with
the virtues of "incomplete internalization"); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Incomplete Internalization and Compliance with Human Rights Law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 725, 727 (2008)
(defining "incomplete internalization" as "persistent decoupling") [hereinafter Goodman &
Jinks, Incomplete Internalization].
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and rendering the tribunal ineffective under transjudicialism theorists'
rationalistic account of judicial dialogue.
The problem of conflating effectiveness and compliance even when
asserting the distinction is further compounded by the fact that legal
scholars rarely seek to develop theories about the conditions under
which human rights norms and decisions lead to the associated regime's
effectiveness that are rooted in empirically testable hypotheses.2 0 This is
a startling fact for many who, like Helfer and Slaughter, attempt to make
descriptive and normative claims about disciplinary and institutional renewal while blithely ignoring existing data produced on the social
impact of human rights regimes (at least the data existing outside certain
highly publicized contexts like the European Union). 2 1 "Managerialists"
like the Chayeses have pointed out that non-compliance is often nonvolitional or inadvertent: the result of a lack of technical, administrative,
or financial capacity, ambiguity in treaty (and a judgment's) terms,212
unavoidable time lags associated with implementation, unforeseen
' Non-compliance could also
changes in conditions, or "role strain."283
be
rooted in second-order conditions such as defects in social sanctioning or
global "acculturation," that is, in "the general process of adopting the
beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture.' 2' Setting
aside the parochialism and self-serving bias of the European experiment
280.
For a recent and significant exception, see Hathaway, supra note 22, at 1963-68
(discussing the challenges of measuring effectiveness of human rights treaties through quantitative analysis, but stressing the importance of compliance-based arguments). See also
Douglas Cassel, Does InternationalHuman Rights Law Make a Difference?, 2 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 121, 122, 131 (2001); Kingsbury, supra note 241, at 347, 355.
281.
See infra note 287 for important empirical work by Okafor and studies on social
movement advocacy cited by Goodman and Jinks in this direction.
282.
Attempts to discover whether states comply with their commitments presume, of
course, that states have firm knowledge about what there is to comply with. For political scientists, this is a given, which arguably also explains the scientists' enthusiasm for compliance
studies. For lawyers, however, a "compliance problem" is likely to arise as to what is perceived to be required on the part of states who are the addressees of the relevant obligations.
Such riddles are unfailingly bound to make a non-lawyer despair. See IAN HACKING, THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999). I am grateful to Craig Scott for drawing my attention to this point.
283.
CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 184, at 9-17, 26-27. "Role strain" is defined in the
literature as the membership by a state in various identity groups in which different norms
prevail, and self-perception as an "outgroup" vis-A-vis the "ingroup" that has shaped the norm
in question. See Moshe Hirsch, Compliance with InternationalNorms in the Age of Globalization: Two Theoretical Perspectives, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 226, at 166, 182-83.
284.
Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 22, at 638. For a critique,
which this Article shares, that the latter's acculturation theory assumes a highly homogenized
global social environment, a "global culture," or a global social structure that affects pathways
of diffusion in which norms operate, that it is not defended normatively, and it remains empirically parochial, see Asher Alkoby, Theories of Compliance with InternationalLaw and the
Challenge of CulturalDifference, 4 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 151, 177-78 (2008).
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as a measure of effectiveness, a supranational court "whose decisions
receive moderate or even low compliance rates" when it engages in judicial dialogue may, in fact, be "highly effective in changing state
behavior '2 81 over time and may help diffuse culturally sensitive "counterhegemonic norms. 286 This will be the case through increased domestic
and international pressure by transnational human rights advocacy networks and militant action of local popular forces (such as labor unions)
in the Third World, 287 and "legal mediation" by indigenous communities
appropriating and redeploying international human rights norms locally. 8 Some scholars have buttressed this point with important
empirical research that needs to be supplemented. 9
Constructivist accounts of law as constitutive rather than reflective
of social relations treat norms and shared ideas and beliefs as fundamental not only to behavior but, as this Article has suggested, to actor
identities underlying behavior as well as relationships fostered between
them. Culture enters the fray of constructivist analysis, although its role
with rights discourse as constitutive of norms, relationships, and identities remains to be explored fully in critical socio-legal scholarship. State
action in the human rights realm may be seen as variously motivated by
a desire to comply (or not) with norms, in order to maintain a sense of
identity as law-abiding (evincing a belief in human rights as internal culturally appropriate standards of behavior) or law-violating. Herbert
Kelman, a leading scholar of social behavioralism, distinguishes compliance and social internalization from "identification," which he describes
as an entity adopting induced behavior in order to be like the influencer,
or because it is associated with a desired relationship with the latter.290
285.
Helfer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at 919.
286.
Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra note 22, at 653; see also Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, InternationalLaw and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical,
and Normative Challenges,54 DuKE L.J. 983, 998 (2005).
287.
See Obiora Okafor, Do InternationalHuman Rights Institutions Matter? The African System on Human and Peoples' Rights, Quasi-Constructivism, and the Possibility of
PeacebuildingWithin African States, 8 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 413 (2004). See generally OKAFOR,
supra note 78, ch. 7; Goodman & Jinks, Incomplete Internalization, supra note 279, at 73435, 741-43 (arguing that the adoption of a human rights norm supranationally can induce
changes in "domestic political opportunity structure," thus opening up vistas for social movement mobilization toward greater domestic policy reforms).
288.
See e.g., Galit A. Sarfaty, International Norm Diffusion in the Pimicikamak Cree
Nation: A Model of Legal Mediation,48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 441 (2007).
289.
See Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Evaluating UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Toward a
ParadigmaticTransition, in THE MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFECTIVENESS, FAIRNESS AND VALIDITY

290.

155, 165 (2003).

Herbert C. Kelman, Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Proc-

esses of Attitude Change, 2 J. CONFLICT

RESOL.

51, 53 (1958); see also Charles O'Reilly I &

Jennifer Chatman, OrganizationalCommitment and Psychological Attachment: The Effects of
Compliance, Identification, and Internalization on ProsocialBehavior, 71 J. APPLIED PSY-
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Identification actually precedes Koh's phase of norm-internalization in
transnational legal process. It is a function of a state tapping into the judicial repository of rights discourse in which a court engages through
dialogue such that the addressees of its decisions accept them in the
terms the court sets for them, but in appropriating and re-signifying them
according to their own ways and culturally rooted traditions and desires,
even though they ultimately fail to comply or compliance is less than
perfect. At stake is what Goodman and Jinks call "state socialization"
through "acculturation-based judicial borrowing"29' as the internalization
of norms constitutive of identity formation. They describe this process as
one by which the collective expectations of members of an identity
group come to feel taken for granted and mimicked by new members. 292
CHOL. 492 (1986) (applying Kelman's three-dimensional influence analysis to empirical re-

search regarding organizational commitment and psychological attachment among university
staff and students), referenced in Koh, Why Do Nations Obey, supra note 150, at 2601 n.3.
Koh treats norm-internalization and identification as two different aspects of a single phenomenon he calls "obedience." Id. at 2656-57. I read his understanding of identification as
coming much closer to his description of "social" (the public legitimacy of a norm results in
widespread obedience) and "political" (elites accepting an international norm and adopting it
as government policy), rather than "legal" internalization (incorporation of the norm into the
domestic legal system). See id; cf Galit A. Sarfaty, The World Bank and the Internalizationof
Indigenous Rights Norms, 114 YALE L.J. 1791, 1810-13 (2005). Sarfaty's "more nuanced
version of transnational legal process theory" emphasizes relations internal and external to an
international organization, taking the World Bank as its model. Id. at 1811. It claims that at
the interaction stage, "external actors can exploit tensions within an international institution
and play the institution against itself," while at the internalization stage, "governments both
influence and are influenced by the World Bank." Id. at 1810. Her point, however, is less
about how identities of domestic, local, and supranational actors are shaped through their
interaction and the relationships constructed through their encounter, than about how norms
are internalized in the culture of an international institution such as the World Bank as an
aspect of its identity. See generally id. at 1810-14. Norm internalization, then, means internalization in both the organization and the countries where organizational policies are sought
to be implemented. As far as the former is concerned, it becomes a matter of "fit with the
organizational culture," see Galit A. Sarfaty, Why Culture Matters in InternationalInstitutions: The Marginality of Human Rights at the World Bank, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 647, 654
(2009), which can sometimes mean neglect or even violation by the institution of its own
norms when facing domestic political and legal constraints. Sarfaty, supra, at 1809.
291.
RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript excerpt, at 25), excerpts available at http://iilj.org/courses/documents/2008Colloquium.SessionlO.Goodman.pdf (last visited
Mar. 10, 2010). References to this text below are to the manuscript consolidating excerpts
from the book.
292.
Id. Goodman and Jinks do not expound a robust normative theory to describe the
fluctuating content of cultural identities and the constitutive effects of a diverse range of cultural norms at work in acculturation in the intersection between global institutional
developments and local forces so much as they theorize state behavior within a highly specified governance frame of cognition and social pressurization-"global culture" -following a
linear script of progress through global norm diffusion enacted from patterns of Western liberal state practices. Compare id. at 28 (stating that "[a]cculturation, however, expects that in
certain circumstances judges will adopt global models despite divergent national needs and
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To speak of a human rights norm's effectiveness, on such an account, is
to claim that it has led a state to maintain or construct its cultural identity
relationally as law-abiding over time through reflexive identification or
socialization with local social movements as well as with the adjudicator
and his or her reasons for rules (and interactions), rather than with the
actual norms or decisions adopted. This is a stance which may or may
not immediately translate into meeting the legal standard of compliance
sought through persuasion, but which significantly shapes social relationships between various actors involved in the process. The key role of the
overseer of the judicial process, the "social influence situation," in Kelman's terms,293 is to manage an interactive dialectical process of
justificatory discourse and rhetorical knowledge-formation among various
transnational actors. In such a process, human rights norms, institutions,
and discourse are not only invoked, harnessed in local cultural contestations and struggles, interpreted and redeployed, but also identified withas a function of cultural identity construction-in such a way as to
ultimately lead to their seeping-into or "vernacularization" in domestic
social and political structures. 94 Self-identification and self-definition of a
wide range of social actors engaging in interactions in relation to each
other rather than state compliance are therefore at the heart of the effectiveness of a court's judicial interactions. Yet because of their inherent
inter-subjectivity and psycho-linguistic dimension, they are much more
difficult to control and disentangle from mere behavioral changes. The
last part of this Article illustrates through a case study that their utility
will ultimately depend on the rhetorical force of these actors' appropriaconditions"), with id. at 30 (claiming that "whether liberal democratic states participate in the
adoption of a rights practice may be crucial to its institutionalization and diffusion [by means
of acculturation]" and that "[t]he source for illiberal change in the diffusion of a norm may
have to arise from or pass through these states"). Goodman and Jinks elsewhere define global
culture as being "reflected in universally applicable models that define the legitimate actors in
world society, the legitimate goals of these actors, and the most appropriate means of pursuing
these goals." Goodman & Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, supra note

236, at 1758. Similarly, they assume that the adoption of a "global human rights script" is a
potential focal point for studying the extent to which social processes of acculturation explain
patterns of decoupling or deviation from the global model with an aim to fashioning interventions in institutional design to bridge the gap between normative commitment and local
practices. See Goodman & Jinks, Incomplete Internalization,supra note 279, at 734-37. Rare-

ly, if ever, are there any allusions to the cultural legitimacy and "content" of the global script
or norm, how these norms came about in the first place, where boundaries are drawn for the
purposes of assessing "decoupling," and how the "gap" is posited. See id. As Alkoby points
out, "a legitimate reference group is a condition for this form of social influence," and such an
approach "fails to ask where international norms come from and the extent to which relations
of domination are implicated in their global diffusion." Alkoby, supra note 284, at 177; see
also Ozsu, supra note 151, at 31-34.
293.
Kelman, supra note 290, at 54.
294.

SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER JUSTICE: TRANSLATING IN-

TERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE

103-217, 219-22 (2006).
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tion of rights discourse, the amenability of self-definition and selfidentification processes to concrete observation, and the relationships
developed and sustained through these social interactions.
Il1.

"JUDICIAL GLOBALIZATION" AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE:
A CASE STUDY AND CRITIQUE

Evaluating human rights regime effectiveness necessarily requires
data about state behavior plus a sound theory and analysis of the causality of behavior and effectiveness coupled with a counterfactual
analysis.296 The following case study deals with the "death row" phenomenon, an issue that has attracted the attention of transjudicialism
theorists. Thus, it allows for a close and critical engagement with
transjudicialism scholarship on its own methodological terrain through
counterfactual analysis to test its assumptions. The normative content of
this social phenomenon has, indeed, been shaped by judicial dialogue
against which it would be interesting to test the soundness of the theory
of relational self-identification expounded in this Article as an aspect of
interactional, judicial socio-discursive cultural identity-formation and
transformation processes.
297

In a string of cases originating with Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica,

the Human Rights Committee has repeatedly rejected the claim that detention on death row, no matter how prolonged, and its associated
physical and psychological distress amounts to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment prohibited under Article 7 of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. In Pratt &
Morgan, two condemned prisoners argued that their detention on death
295.
In the field of human rights protection, where problems are commonly affected by a
range of distributional factors (political, economic, cultural, and social), particularly in relation to economic, social and cultural rights, and reliable data on the impact of rules on social
engineering is not readily available, it is not surprising that existing research on the effectiveness on human rights norms has focused on issues of compliance and behavioral change
through reliance of indicators and best practices.
Counterfactual analysis has been defined as "a comparison of the observed outcome
296.
and the analyst's best guess about the likely course of events if the treaty or commitment or
particular institution had not existed." Raustiala, supra note 264, at 398. Evaluating the effectiveness of a human rights tribunal engaging in judicial dialogue inevitably requires such an
analysis. See James D. Fearon, Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in PoliticalScience,
43 WORLD POL. 169, 169 (1991). Of course, generalizations based on case studies may also
involve pitfalls. See Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1517, 1546-61 (2004). The framework proposed in this Article is
offered as one possible explanation of the impact of norms and identity-building on the effectiveness of international human rights law.
297.
Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica, Comm'n Nos. 210/1986 & 225/1987, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
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row for nearly ten years violated Article 7, whose language is essentially
identical to that used in the European Convention on Human Rights. The
Committee, which did not reference Soering v. United Kingdom, 98 a case
pending at the time before the Strasbourg court that produced a highly
fact-specific ruling in favor of the complainants, adopted a somewhat
more conservative approach than the latter. Rejecting the petitioners'
claim on the facts presented, it held that "[i]n principle prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment even if they can be a source of mental strain for the convicted
prisoners ...."'99 It stressed, however, that "an assessment of the circumstances of each case would be necessary."3°° In the subsequent case of
Barrett & Sutcliffe v. Jamaica,' the Committee refused to find a violation in a fourteen-year stay on death row, making no reference to
Soering.3°2 But in Kindler v. Canada,3 °3 while reaffirming its position that
death row detention does not per se violate the ICCPR, the HRC gave
"careful regard to" the Strasbourg Court's approach, adopting much of
the reasoning of Soering while distinguishing its unique facts.3" In cases
following Kindler, the HRC's promise to conduct a fact-specific review
of each case has rarely been realized. The "controversy" that the Committee's jurisprudence had sparked culminated in Johnson v. Jamaica, in
which an eleven-member majority stated that it would continue to apply
a facts-and-circumstances approach to death row petitions. °5 They cautioned, however, that a treaty violation would be found only if a
petitioner could demonstrate "compelling circumstances of the detention" other than its length,3° which were not present in the case before
them. This effectively meant that it would be highly unlikely that the
Committee would find a violation of the ICCPR. This approach effectively prompted a retreat from the purportedly objective, fact-specific
methodology paralleling that of Soering to a "smell test" where an unfavorable ruling against a state would be made only in exceptional
298.
Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 42-44 (1989).
299.
Pratt & Morgan, U.N. Doc. A/44/40, 13.6.
300.
Id.
301.
Barrett & Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, Comm'n Nos. 270/1988 & 271/1988, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 47th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IX, at 254, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992).
302.
Committee member Chanet did, however, cite to the Soering case in support of her
rather terse conclusion that "[a] very long period on death row . .. cannot exonerate a State
party from its obligations under article 7 of the Covenant." Id. app. (separate opinion of Chanet).
303.
Kindler v. Canada, Comm'n No. 470/1981, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (1993).
304.
Id. 15.3.
305.
Johnson v. Jamaica, Comm'n No. 588/1994, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/588/1994 (1996).
306.
Id. U 8.5-8.6.
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circumstances, following the adjudicators' sentimentality, ideology, or
"hunch."3t0
What lessons can be drawn from this development? Can one speak
of the Johnson decision as being "effective"? Using compliance here as a
variable would be meaningless as there is, strictly speaking, nothing for
Jamaica to comply with. Although the Committee did not explain the
shift away from European jurisprudence upon which its earlier ruling in
Kindler firmly rested, one might suspect it was gravely concerned about
the palatability of its decision in a Third World state where the political
climate was different from the one existing in European nations-an
anxiety voiced earlier by then-Committee member Rosalyn Higgins although hardly shared by all Western members 3° 8 -and more-so given that
petitioners had repeatedly asked the HRC to follow a widely diverse
range of national and international case law adopting a more propetitioner approach. As Helfer explains, "[w]ere the Committee to adopt
the ECHR's more rigorous approach, it would be setting a standard of
protection so far out of touch with domestic law that many States might
be unwilling to follow it, ' °9 which might have the effect of leading states
to speed up appeals and carry out death sentences expeditiously in order
to avoid a detailed factual review of each case.
Put differently, Jamaica would not have perceived favorably or identified with the Committee's discursive exercise, which in these
circumstances would have had no constructive or transformative effect
shifting (even incrementally) Jamaica's cultural identity from a
law-violating to a law-abiding nation according to localized standards of
Joseph C. Hutcheson Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in
307.
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). Four dissenters in the case strongly objected
to the "compelling circumstances" formulation as demonstrating "a lack of flexibility that
would not allow [the Committee] to examine ... the circumstances of each case." Johnson v.
Jamaica,supra note 305, app. B (Bhagwati, Bruni Celli, Pocar, & Vallejo, dissenting). In fact,
the outcome in Johnson led Committee member Francisco Jos6 Aguilar Urbina to claim that
"the Human Rights Committee's wish to be consistent with its previous jurisprudence has led
it to rule that the length of detention on death row is not in any case contrary to article 7 of the
Covenant." Id. app. C (Urbina, dissenting); see also Hylton v. Jamaica, Comm'n No.
600/1994, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/571D/600/1994
(1996) (Urbina, dissenting). For Judge Chanet, the matter is ultimately highly subjective, for
although "each case must be judged on its merits" (referring to the standard boiler-plate list of
reasons pertaining to the physical and psychological treatment of the prisoner and his age and
health and the availability of domestic judicial procedure and remedies), "[tlhese are the limits
to the subjectivity available to the Committee ... excluding factors such as what is preferable
from the supposed standpoint of the prisoner, death or awaiting death, or fear of a possible
misinterpretation by the State of the message contained in the Committee's decisions." See the
individual opinion of Committee member Chanet in Johnson, supra note 305, app. A.
308.
Rosalyn Higgins, The United Nations: Still a Forcefor Peace?, 52 MODERN L. REV.
1,8(1989).
Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285,
309.
329 (1999).
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legality, elaborated relationally through internal cultural dialogue and
contestation. The effect, rather, would have been quite the opposite.
Thus, when the region's highest court, the Privy Council, used an expansionist strategy and issued a highly unpopular decision that increased the
ICCPR's legalization level in the area of capital punishment, the court
attracted local protests and was charged with "engaging in a form of 'judicial imperialism' by 'super-impos[ing] ...Eurocentric notions and
values' on the region."3 ° Denouncing the Optional Protocol to the
ICCPR (which grants petitioners a right to bring a complaint against
their national government before the HRC) then became the only viable
political strategy for Caribbean countries, as exiting the treaty framework would allow state authorities to proceed with executions while
avoiding potentially violating Article 73
While a negative finding against Jamaica would undoubtedly have
yielded an ever-more aggressive stance by that State against the Committee, one can only guess what the likely outcome of the factual
circumstances raised in the Johnson case would have been in the absence of the Committee's decision altogether, in application of
counterfactual analysis. Even so, it is not unreasonable to have expected
from that state increasing or at least continuing instances of indefinite
detention on death row, or even hasty executions (although Jamaica has
310.
Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: InternationalRelations Theory
and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1832, 1888-89 (2002) [hereinafter Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights]; see also
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,

POLITICS, MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIALS

30-42 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the fact that do-

mestic courts take contextual factors into account in death penalty cases). Such popular
uprising was also palpable in the aftermath of the 1993 Privy Council ruling in Pratt & Morgan, in which the Council ruled that prisoners convicted of capital crimes and not executed
within five years suffered "inhuman or degrading punishment" and should have their death
sentences commuted; the ruling prompted Jamaica to abolish the link to the Council, set up its
own regional supreme court, and eliminate formal ties to the British legal system. See Heifer,
Overlegalizing Human Rights, supra, at 1872, 1882-84, 1888. The House of Representatives
and the Senate approved the retention of the death penalty in November and December 2008
and the lower house of the Parliament will consider a proposition that the constitution of Jamaica be amended to remove the five year stricture imposed by the Privy Council. Schauer
explains that in countries seeking to cast off an imperialist past (as is the case for Jamaica, as a
former British West Indies Crown colony), it is likely to be particularly important (as an aspect
of identity building) to establish an indigenous constitution that includes a set of human rights
protections, although these protections might not mirror those of international human rights
law; rather resistance to foreign exchanges and ideas is equally likely to be the rule. See Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in GOVERNANCE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 253-54, 257 (Joseph S. Nye & J.D. Donahue eds., 2000).
311.
Jamaica's denunciation became effective on January 23, 1998. For a thorough exposition of how the "overlegalization" of a government's human rights commitments can lead to
a backlash against human rights institutions (even when at the initiative of domestic courts),
see Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights, supra note 310, at 1851-58, 1886-94. On the unilateral exit from treaties, see Laurence Heifer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005).
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not executed anyone for twenty years), since the state would have received no authoritative guidance as to which scenario would constitute a
violation.
From this perspective alone, the decision would appear somewhat
"effective," if by effectiveness we mean a gradual shift in a state's perception of legitimacy of and self-identification with a supranational
institution. Such a claim about the decision's effectiveness might, however, often rest on a policy value judgment between conflicting interests
and carries the risk of turning into a Trojan horse for regressive politics
and closure strategies. By the most generous characterization, "compliance" here would be automatic, as the norm established by the
Committee would simply "mirror" state conduct. But counterfactual reasoning does suggest that there is likely to have been a cultural change in
behavior due to the decision and the relationship between Jamaica and
the Committee that was structured through that encounter. Considering
the twenty-eight similar complaints that have been brought against Jamaica and before the HRC since Johnson was decided, it would, of
course, be inaccurate to claim that the decision has had any definitive,
transformative effect on that state's core identity. Jamaica has openly and
repeatedly resisted the HRC's authority over the years by failing to cooperate by frequently ignoring its recommendations and decisions." 2
Nonetheless, this history of extensive interaction with the Committee,
combined with the Privy Council precedent, would indicate that the decision did somehow alleviate-through the rhetorical practice and
interaction between different actors such as the Committee members, the
state, local courts, and protest movements-the country's intransigent
stance as part of its internal value set, however short-lived the effect may
have been. At the same time, and perhaps more importantly, the HRC's
approach exhibited sagacity and a healthy dose of political pragmatism,
as it would have enhanced opportunities for Jamaica to make common
cause with the Committee and to perceive its future rulings as authoritative and legitimate, particularly in extreme death row cases of mental
and physical degradation where there could be little doubt, by the state's
own account and admission, that the petitioners' rights were violated.3 3
The effect of the Committee's rhetorical practice was not simply to arrive at a decision that Jamaica would accept, but also to sustain a
relationship such that ongoing decisions relating to that country's human
rights record could be made collectively in the interests of those most
312.
See generally Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights, supra note 310, at 1870-79.
313.
See also Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, supra note 150, at 206 (broadly predicting that a nation will come into compliance with international norms if allowed to internally
develop its cultural identity while interacting in international norm-generating fora).
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vulnerable and dependable on the state. Such a relationship would, in
turn, foster relations between supranational tribunals such as the Committee with individuals and groups, and between individuals, groups, and
local social movements and the State. There is, however, no developed
normative account of a "good" relationship between the Committee and
Jamaica that underwrites this argument, for a focus on identity construction through rhetorical knowledge production does not dictate ex ante
what types of relationships are constructive or serve to promote particular values in supranational human rights adjudication.
It is not insignificant that transjudicialism theorists have cited the
decision as an illustration of what they call the "discursive constraints of
the global community of law" in which the Committee participated by
engaging in dialogue.3 4 In other words, the decision was eminently
influenced by pressures of professional and personal socialization of autonomous and culturally bounded rational judges315 within an already
pre-existing, cohesive, socio-cultural environment, a global community
of law or regulatory network of similarly situated subjects. This is a decidedly odd and lopsided use of precedent which increasingly finds
comfort in biases and blind-spots within the vocabulary of TLPAF itself.
It is one that, nonetheless, highlights the importance of emerging scholarship on global administrative law and procedure. 6 Yet how can we
distinguish, on these scholars' account, cases warranting "informed divergence" from those which do not in any principled manner and on a
normatively meaningful basis? Their argument about the discursive constraints of a purportedly apolitical and ahistorical global legal
community is rhetorically useful in quelling fears that such a loose
community of judicial elites will capitalize on this institutional void to
314.
Helfer & Slaughter, Response, supra note 49, at 953-54; see also Helfer et al.,
supra note 225, at 40-41 (reviewing and supplementing "principal-agent theory," which
analyzes "the legal, political, and discursive constraints that together create a 'strategic space'
that defines the boundaries within which tribunals can be effective").
315.
Id. This is perhaps the only aspect of Slaughter's theory that exhibits many of the
same assumptions about networks that social norms scholarship (theories of persuasion) predicts about the characteristics among group members-the building of relationships, the
exchange of information, the development of shared network standards, and the professional
socialization of members-as well as about processes of social pressure, or "acculturation,"
that conventional constructivists have begun to map. See SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER,
supra note 31, at 3-4, 136-37, 196-200; Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States, supra
note 22 (discussing process of acculturation). Some authors are, however, skeptical about the
possibility that regulatory networks might promote convergence through social processes of
networking, persuasion, and acculturation, finding the evidence to be "conjectural and pitched
at a high level of generality" and calling for "much more detailed theoretical and empirical
analysis by those who wish to rely on such theories to establish the effectiveness of TRNs."
See Verdier, supra note 123, at 171; see also id. at 165-67.
316.
See Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 15-28 (2005).
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usurp law-making powers of states and introduce polluting legal traditions under the mantra of global legal pluralism without any checks.3 "
Yet this neither satisfactorily explains the rich and complex motives and
incentives these judges have to engage in dialogue (or not) as part of
their cognitive world-view mapping, nor the distributive impact of identity-based choices and decisions by states to comply (or not) with their
rulings through reflexive, cultural engagement with the underlying
norms. It also fails to assuage Third World concerns about a resurgence
of neo-colonialist and imperial motives in transjudicialism. The theory
does not account for how factors such as power asymmetries and
violence (in a Bourdieusian "symbolic" sense 3"), local cultural contestations, and identity-building through appropriations of rights discourse
are relevant in structuring the relational process. This suggests that neither formal law nor professional socialization alone can achieve this end.
State compliance with human rights norms and decisions will reflect a
continuous search for maintaining a balance between judicial group and
peer pressure, judicial identities and competing identities, claims and
interests marshalled by social movements at home which influence how
norms develop through such interactions and are ultimately implemented
and enforced. Eschewing an identity-based relational theoretical framework for analyzing compliance and architectural issues relating to
human rights may largely explain the frailties of decade-long reform
programs at the United Nations in this area and its obliviousness, as well
as that of the vocabulary of TLPAF itself, to the contributions of Third
World resistance to judicial norm-enunciation and internalization.
From the vantage point of a political actor's behavior, agency, and
self-identification with other actors and discursive judicial activity, Johnson suggests that it may be crucially important for a court to refuse to
emulate the jurisprudence of another if its opinion is to be culturally "effective," that is, legitimately received by those most likely in the Third
World to resent a "foreign" intervention. It demonstrates the constructivist power of supranational human rights institutions, of the norms
and ideas they generate, and the dynamics of their iterations of judicial
interaction through the constitution of rhetorical knowledge through
alliances with and resistance by local forces. Neither a technocratic
317.
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 31, at 29-31. For a more elaborate
exposd, see Anne-Marie Slaughter, Agencies on the Loose? Holding Government Networks
Accountable, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 522 (George A. Bermann et al. eds., 2000).
318.
I understand violence in this context, following Bourdieu, as symbolic and entailing
an imposition of unconscious structures and meaning that tend to perpetuate the structures of
action of the dominant, thus simultaneously legitimizing the power of its producers and hiding
the rapportde force behind the production of such meaning. See generally BOURDIEU, supra
note 138.
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compliance-orientated rationalistic approach to effectiveness, nor a liberal, even Marxist, one that stresses the prior convergence and
superimposition of fixed state-society preferences with institutional interests is able to account for the inter-subjective elaboration and
interpretation of human rights norms, and their complex role as the embodiment and constitution of social structures and39 relationships and
cultural forces both domestically and supranationally. 1

CONCLUSION

This Article has sought to challenge the prevailing orthodoxy about
achieving the effectiveness of supranational human rights tribunals
through judicial dialogue by drawing attention to the exclusions and distributive consequences operated by a particular form of celebratory
rhetorical practice-the claim to "newness" of a global community of
courts-in the literature on transjudicialism. Specifically, I have argued
that the narrowness in focus engendered by the ideological premises of
mainstream international human rights lawyers and American transjudicialism theorists' on-going research agenda in the post-Cold War era
actually distorts an issue of immense practical concern and real-world
application for understanding the sociology of violations, abetting, as it
might so happen, ends which have been justified by recourse to the findings such research has supplied.32 ° Transjudicialism is as popular today
among human rights lawyers and advocates as it was during the post
Cold-War, and this tendency is likely to persist. The Article illustrated
that any assessment of the impact of judicial dialogue upon the effectiveness of the international human rights legal regime requires a critical
evaluation of both. But these are the very issues that transjudicialism
scholarship evades.
A full-fledged theory of effectiveness which is methodologically
sound, empirically defensible, normatively useful, and receptive to the
cultural pluralist project animating much of human rights discourse and
Third World critical scholarship today must take stock of the complex
interactions among different governance forms and human rights systems, and between different types of human rights norms, normative
orders, and actors and cultural identity (trans)formation processes. The
319.
Kingsbury, supra note 241, at 363.
320.
Heifer and Slaughter are, one assumes, not so much preoccupied with legitimacy
concerns as with the search for conceptual and epistemological clarity and aptitude for further
research, satisfied with what the Chayeses call a "first approximation surrogate for effectiveness." See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47 INT'L ORG. 175,
176 (1993); Helfer & Slaughter, Theory, supra note 27, at 391.
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Article introduced the methodological-theoretical sketch of "judicial socio-discursive interactionism" as such an explanatory model. It exposed,
through a review of the extant scholarship on transjudicialism and a case
study analyzed by transjudicialism theorists themselves, how this model
could nicely complement recent sociological research in the field of international human rights with which it shares many affinities; namely by
emphasizing, in addition to the insights generated by this body of work,
the importance of the cultural relational constitution of rhetorical knowledge, as well as of the relationships fostered through social interactions,
to identity-building at the supranational, domestic, and sub-national levels. The contours and parameters of this framework will be further
refined and tested in subsequent work. The Article's more modest ambition was to make the argument that the Herculean task of devising such a
"theory," despite misgivings we may have about grand theorizing,
remains a worthwhile and much-needed counterhegemonic strategy to
claims of "newness," which reproduce exclusions of certain normgenerating cultural practices through a positivist and rationalist legalprocess orientation. It is one which, in the end, appears to be as pressing
today for understanding prognostics about renewing the discipline of
international human rights law to account for its "effectiveness" as the
related need to historicize and theorize cultural resistance in and to international law and international (and supranational) human rights
institutions.32 '
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